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Abstract: Subsidiarity is en vogue in international human rights law. From a largely
implicit and mainly jurisprudential principle used in discrete guises by international
human rights courts, it has become increasingly present in human rights reasoning
and is about to become entrenched in the text of international human rights treaties.
Past the usual truisms about States having the primary responsibility to secure human
rights and international human rights institutions having only a supervisory function,
however, the notion, role and justification of subsidiarity in international human
rights law remain very difficult to capture. Broadly speaking, scholarly strategies have
divided into two groups. Most authors focus on one aspect of subsidiarity (usually
the margin of appreciation of domestic authorities), while fewer look for the broader
underpinning principle. The former often neglect the broader question, however,
while the latter have often been lured by one dimension of the prestigious history of
the principle of subsidiarity and conflate subsidiarity in international human rights
law with one or many of its different conceptions in other legal and political contexts
(e.g. in a federal state or in the European Union). In this article, I argue that the
concept of subsidiarity is at play in international human rights law, but that human
rights subsidiarity is very different from the other conceptions of subsidiarity we
know of. To understand it, we need to go back to the relationship between human
rights and (democratic) politics and, accordingly, to the role of international human
rights law and its complementary relation to domestic human rights law. The pro-
posed argument is three-pronged. After a first section on subsidiarity in international
human rights law and the different shapes it takes in practice, the second section
compares human rights subsidiarity with the subsidiarity encountered in other social,
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political and legal contexts, and does so with respect to different dimensions of
subsidiarity: its subjects, objects, functions, justifications, tests, limits and reviews.
The third section draws various implications of the specificity of human rights sub-
sidiarity, and in particular for how we should go about interpreting it and addressing
some of the challenges it is currently facing in practice.
Keywords: Subsidiarity; complementarity; human rights; equality; democracy;
margin of appreciation; supranational judicial review
“It is also important to emphasise the fundamentally subsidiary role of the
Convention mechanism. The national authorities have direct democratic legit-
imation and are, as the Court has held on many occasions, in principle
better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions.
In matters of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic society
may reasonably differ widely, the role of the domestic policy-maker should
be given special weight.”
SAS v. France, ECHR 2014 (not published yet) (CE:ECHR:2014:
0701JUD004383511), par. 129 (emphasis added).
I. Introduction
Subsidiarity is en vogue in international human rights law (IHRL). Recently, one
author, now a judge at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), argued
that the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)1 had entered the
“age of subsidiarity.”2
From a largely implicit and mainly jurisprudential principle used in discrete
guises by international human rights bodies and courts since the 1960s,3 subsidi-
arity has become increasingly present and even central in international human
rights reasoning.4 The principle is actually about to be entrenched into the text of
international human rights treaties. Thus, when Protocol 15 to the ECHR enters
into force, a new recital on subsidiarity5 will be added into the Preamble to the
ECHR, thereby making the subsidiarity principle an integral part of the
1 This article focuses on the ECHR for this is the international human rights legal regime where
subsidiarity has been discussed most, as I will explain. I will come back to the differences between it
and the other, both judicialized and non-judicialized, regional and international regimes later in the
argument.
2 Robert Spano, “Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of
Subsidiarity,” Human Rights Law Review 14 (2014): 487-502.
3 Since 23rd July, 1968 for subsidiarity: Case “relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of
languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium, ECHR (1967) Series A no 5
(CE:ECHR:1967:0209JUD000147462), par. 10. And since 7th December, 1976 for the margin
of appreciation: Handyside v. United Kingdom, ECHR (1976) Series A no 24
(CE:ECHR:1976:1207JUD000549372), par. 48 and 54.
4 See e.g. in recent case-law, Von Hannover v. Germany (No 2), ECHR 2012-I 399
(CE:ECHR:2012:0207JUD004066008); Mennesson v. France, ECHR 2014 (not published yet)
(CE:ECHR:2014:0626JUD006519211); SAS v. France, ECHR 2014 (not published yet)
(CE:ECHR:2014:0701JUD004383511). See also Alastair Mowbray, “Subsidiarity and the
European Convention on Human Rights,” Human Rights Law Review 15 (2015): 313-41, at 337-9.
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Convention itself and a principle that constrains the ECtHR as much as ECHR
States Parties.6 Most recently, and in line with the subsidiarity-based approach
adopted in the reform process of the ECtHR that has been constantly deepened
since the conferences of Interlaken in 2010, Brighton in 2012 and Izmir in 2013,
the March 2015 Brussels Declaration of the Council of Europe’s Committee of
Ministers stressed once again how important subsidiarity has become for the
future of the Convention system.7
At the same time, however, one cannot but wonder at how quickly subsidiarity
has become the cure to all ills. It has been endorsed by all sides in the current
reform process of the ECtHR, and in particular by the States most averse to the
Court’s interventions in their domestic affairs, like Russia, the United Kingdom
or Switzerland, and the Court alike. Gradually, indeed, subsidiarity has also been
turned into an instrument for the ECtHR to prevent ECHR violations through
its fast developing preventive and remedial control8 and to exercize an abstract
control over States’ institutional and procedural framework of human rights pro-
tection.9 This has enabled it to invoke subsidiarity to prevent human rights’
violations and hence to handle its docket. Judicial statistics actually confirm
that the increasing references to subsidiarity in the ECtHR’s case-law since
2010 do not result from States Parties’ applications and pleadings, as one
might expect, but from the Court itself, and especially from dissenting
judges.10 A first explanation for this success may be the so-called “duality of
subsidiarity” and, more exactly, its background: the primary responsibility of
national authorities in the Convention system.11 When the “two sides” of the
5 “Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity,
have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the
Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention.” (art. 1
Protocol 15 ECHR). See another reference to subsidiarity in par. 3 of the Preamble to Protocol
16 ECHR.
6 See e.g. Fre´de´ric Sudre, “La subsidiarite´, ‘nouvelle frontie`re’ de la Cour europe´enne des droits de
l’homme – A propos des Protocoles no 15 et 16 a` la Convention,” La Semaine Juridique Edition
Ge´ne´rale 87 (2013): 1912-20; David Milner, “Protocols 15 and 16 to the European Convention on
Human Rights in the Context of the Perennial Process of Reform: A Long and Winding Road,”
Zeitschrift fu¨r Europarechtliche Studien 17(2014): 19-51; Paul Tavernier, “La constitutionnalisation de
la marge d’appre´ciation dans le droit de la Convention europe´enne des droits de l’homme (Protocole
15),” in A Future for the Margin of Appreciation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming
2016).
7 See on these various declarations and the ECHR reform process, http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/
STANDARDSETTING/CDDH/REFORMECHR/.
8 See e.g. Janneke Gerards, “Advisory Opinions, Preliminary Rulings and the New Protocol 16 to
the European Convention on Human Rights—A Comparative and Critical Appraisal,” Maastricht
Journal of European and Comparative Law 4 (2014): 630-51.
9 See e.g., Edouard Dubout, “La proce´duralisation des droits,” in Le principe de subsidiarite´ au sens
du droit de la Convention europe´enne des droits de l’homme, ed. Fre´de´ric Sudre (Bruxelles: Nemesis,
2014), 264-300.
10 See Mowbray, “Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human Rights.”
11 See e.g., Helen Keller and Amrei Mu¨ller, “Das Zusammenspiel von Bundesgericht und EGMR
analysiert aus dem Blickwinkel der Subsidiarita¨t.” Justice – Justiz – Giustizia 1 (2012): 2-24, drawing
on Jonas Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European
Convention on Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009); Spano, “Universality or Diversity of
Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity”; Jean-Marc Sauve´, “Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided
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“subsidiarity-coin”12 are placed in perspective, it is clear that subsidiarity is
not a free rein to States’ appreciation, but a reminder of the possibility of reversing
the priority or “primarity”13 of domestic human rights implementation when the
protection of ECHR rights is not effective.14 It is easy therefore to see how such a
reminder of “shared responsibilities” could please both States and the Court.15
Still, is it correct to speak of “responsibilities” of the ECtHR in this case and how
could an international court “share” them on a par with the institutions of a State?
May subsidiarity be invoked to determine human rights’ duties before States get a
chance to do so? So, it seems that human rights subsidiarity has come to mean
different things to different actors: the “sanctuarization” of States Parties’ inter-
pretations of ECHR rights for some16 and the “constitutionalization” of the
ECtHR’s control for others.17
These recent developments in the legalization of subsidiarity in international
human rights law (hereafter, “human rights subsidiarity”) and the (renewed)
conceptual uncertainty they have brought about make it important to enquire
theoretically about it.18 Past the usual truisms about subsidiarity, and in particular
the fact that, according to it, (i) States have the primary responsibility to secure
human rights, on the one hand, and (ii) international human rights institutions
have only a supervisory function (ii.i.) in cases where minimal human rights
standards are not protected effectively (ii.ii.), on the other, the fact is that the
structure, function and justification of subsidiarity in international human rights
law remain very difficult to capture.
Coin?—The Role of the National Authorities.” European Court of Human Rights. http://www.echr.
coe.int/Documents/Speech_20150130_Seminar_JMSauv%C3%A9_ENG.pdf.
12 See “ECtHR Background paper, Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided Coin?,” European Court of Human
Rights. http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Seminar_background_paper_2015_ENG.pdf.
13 On “primarity” by contrast to “subsidiarity” see Christoffersen. Fair Balance: Proportionality,
Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights.
14 See the 2012 Brighton Declaration, par. 3, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_
Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf. See also Dean Spielmann, “Whither the Margin of
Appreciation?,” Current Legal Problems 67 (2014): 49-65.
15 See e.g., Spano. “Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of
Subsidiarity,”; Spielmann, “Whither the Margin of Appreciation?”; Franc¸oise Tulkens,
“Conclusions generals,” in Le principe de subsidiarite´ au sens du droit de la Convention europe´enne
des droits de l’homme (Bruxelles: Nemesis, 2014), 397-408; Jenneke Gerards, Janneke, “The European
Court of Human Rights and National Courts—Giving Shape to the Notion of “Shared
Responsibility,” in Implementation of the ECHR and of the Judgments of the ECtHR in National
Case Law. A Comparative Analysis (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2014), 13-94.
16 See e.g., Fre´de´ric Sudre, “Le recadrage de l’office du juge europe´en,” in Le principe de
subsidiarite´ au sens du droit de la Convention europe´enne des droits de l’homme (Bruxelles: Nemesis,
2014), 239-64.
17 See e.g., Fiona de Londras, “The European Court of Human Rights, Dual Functionality, and the
Future of the Court after Interlaken,” Irish Human Rights Law Review 2011.
18 See also Andreas Føllesdal, “Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation,” in Human Rights: Moral
or Political?, ed. Adam Etinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2016); George Letsas,
“The Margin of Appreciation Revisited: A Response to Føllesdal,” in ibid.; Dubout, “La proce´dur-
alisation des droits”; Jenneke Gerards, “Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation
Doctrine,” European Law Journal 17 (2011): 80-120; Jan Kratochvı´l, “The Inflation of the
Margin of Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights,” Netherlands Quarterly of
Human Rights 29 (2011): 324-57; George Letsas, “Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation,”
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26 (2006): 705-32, reprinted in Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the
European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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Broadly speaking, scholarly strategies have divided into two groups. Most au-
thors to date have focused on one aspect of subsidiarity19 (mostly the margin of
appreciation of domestic authorities), while fewer have looked at the broader
underpinning principle20–sometimes, even more rarely, they have even done
19 See e.g., on the margin of appreciation: Føllesdal, “Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation”;
Letsas, “The Margin of Appreciation Revisited”; Kanstantsin Dzhetsiarou, European Consensus and
the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015); Mads Andenas, Eirik. Bjorge, and Giuseppe Bianco, eds., A Future for the Margin of
Appreciation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2016); Tavernier, “La constitutionna-
lisation de la marge d’appre´ciation”; Spielmann, “Whither the Margin of Appreciation?”; Luzius
Wildhaber, Arnaldur Hjartarson, and Stephen Donnelly, “No Consensus on Consensus? The
Practice of the European Court of Human Rights,” Human Rights Law Journal 33 (2013): 248-
63; Andrew Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law—Deference and
Proportionality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Kratochvı´l, “The Inflation of the Margin of
Appreciation”; Gerards, “Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine”;
Konstantsin Dzehtsiarou, “Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights,” Public Law (2011): 534-53; Dean
Spielmann, “Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights and the
National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?,”
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 14 (2011): 381-418; Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the
ECHR (Oxford and New York: Intersentia, 2001); Letsas, “Two Concepts of the Margin of
Appreciation”; Jeffrey A. Brauch, “The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law,” Columbia Journal of European
Law 11 (2004): 113-50; Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion
under the European Convention on Human Rights - Human Rights Files n8 17 (Strasbourg: Council
of Europe Publishing, 2000); Johan Callewaert, “Quel avenir pour la marge d’appre´ciation?,” in
Protection des droits de l’homme: la perspective europe´enne, Me´langes a` la me´moire de Rolv Ryssdal /
Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective, Studies in Memory of Rolv Ryssdal, ed. Paul
Mahoney et al. (Cologne et al.: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2000), 147-66; Eva Brems, “The Margin
of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights,” Zeitschrift fu¨r
ausla¨ndisches o¨ffentliches Recht und Vo¨lkerrecht 56 (1996): 240-314; Howard C. Yourow, The Margin
of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of the European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence
(London, New York, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff and Kluwer Press, 1996); Rolv Ryssdal, “The
Coming of Age of the European Convention of Human Rights,” European Human Rights Law Review
1 (1996): 18-29. Ronald St. J. MacDonald, “The Margin of Appreciation,” in The European System
for the Protection of Human Rights, ed. Ronald St.J. MacDonald et al. (Dordrecht et al.: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1993), 83-124. See e.g., on remedial subsidiarity: Abdelgawad E. Lambert, The Execution of
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 2d ed. (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing,
2008); X.-B. Ruedin, L’exe´cution des arreˆts de la Cour Europe´enne des Droits de l’Homme: proce´dure,
obligations des Etats, pratique et re´forme (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2009).
20 Interestingly, while the first mention of subsidiarity in the ECtHR’s case-law dates back to 1968,
its first academic discussions only occurred in the early 1990s. See e.g., Federico Fabbrini, “The
Margin of Appreciation and the Principle of Subsidiarity: A Comparison,” in A Future for the Margin
of Appreciation, ed. Mads Andenas, Eirik Bjorge, Giuseppe Bianco (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
forthcoming): http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2552542; Sabino Cassese,
“Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided Coin?—Ruling Indirectly—Judicial Subsidiarity in the ECHR,”
European Court of Human Rights. http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20150130_
Seminar_Cassese_ENG.pdf; Sauve´, “The Role of National Authorities”; Spano, “Universality or
Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity”; Sudre, “Le recadrage de
l’office du juge europe´en”; Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, “Subsidiarite´ et juges supreˆmes nationaux,
du controˆle de constitutionnalite´ a` la collaboration juridictionnelle. Approche de droit compare,” in
Le principe de subsidiarite´ au sens du droit de la Convention europe´enne des droits de l’homme, ed.
Fre´de´ric Sudre (Bruxelles: Nemesis, 2014), 301-30; David Szymczak, 2014. “Rapport introductif: le
principe de subsidiarite´ dans tous ses e´tats,” in ibid., 15-40; Gerald L. Neuman, “Subsidiarity,” in
Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 360-
78; Sudre. “La subsidiarite´, ‘nouvelle frontie`re’ de la Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme”; Keller
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both21. The former usually neglect the broader question,22 however, while the
latter are often too quickly impressed by certain dimensions of the prestigious
history of the principle of subsidiarity23 and rapidly identify human rights sub-
sidiarity with other conceptions of subsidiarity that prevail in other legal and
political contexts (e.g., in a federal polity24, in the European Union [EU]25 or
in Catholic social doctrine26).
and Mu¨ller, “Das Zusammenspiel von Bundesgericht und EGMR”; Jean-Marc Sauve´, “Le principe
de subsidiarite´ et la protection europe´enne des droits de l’homme,” Recueil Dalloz no. 22 (10 Juin
2010), 1368-1373; William M. Carter, Jr., “Rethinking Subsidiarity in International Human Rights
Adjudication,” Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy 30 (2008): 319-34; Christoffersen, “Fair
Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on Human
Rights”; Laurence R. Helfer, “Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness
as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime,” European Journal of
International Law 19 (2008): 125-59; Stephan Breitenmoser, “Subsidiarita¨t und
Interessenabwa¨gung im Rahmen der EGMR-Rechtsprechung,” in Human Rights, Democracy and
the Rule of Law / Menschenrechte, Demokratie und Rechtsstaat / Droits de l’homme, de´mocratie et Etat de
droit - Liber Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (Zurich: Dike, 2007), 119-41; Mark Villiger, “The
Principle of Subsidiarity in the European Convention on Human Rights,” in Promoting Justice,
Human Rights and Conflict Resolution through International Law / La promotion de la justice, des
droits de l’homme et du re`glement des conflits par le droit international - Liber Amicorum Lucius
Caflisch (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 623-37; Irene Hoffmann, Der Grundsatz der
Subsidiarita¨t im Rechtsschutzsystem der Europa¨ischen Menschenrechtskonvention – Rechtliche
Fundierung, Besonderheiten und Bedeutung (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2007); Dinah Shelton,
“Subsidiarity and Human Rights Law,” Human Rights Law Journal 27 (2006): 4-11; Paolo G.
Carozza, “Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law,” American
Journal of International Law 97 (2003): 38-79; Michele de Salvia, “Controˆle europe´en et principe
de subsidiarite´ – Faut-il encore (et toujours) e´merger a` la marge d’appre´ciation?,” in Mahoney et al.,
ed., Protection des droits de l’homme: la perspective europe´enne, 373-85. Paul Mahoney, “Universality
versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech: Explaining Some Recent Judgments,”
European Human Rights Law Review 4 (1997): 364-79; Herbert Petzold, “The Convention and the
Principle of Subsidiarity,” in MacDonald et al., eds., The European System for the Protection of Human
Rights, 41-62.
21 See e.g., Mowbray, “Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human Rights.”
22 See even Letsas, “Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation”; Føllesdal “Appreciating the
Margin of Appreciation”; Letsas “The Margin of Appreciation Revisited.”
23 For discussions of the principle in various contexts, see e.g., Michelle Evans and Augusto
Zimmermann, eds. Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014); Andreas
Føllesdal, “The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International Law,”
Global Constitutionalism 2 (2013): 37-62; Isabel Feichtner, “Subsidiarity,” in Max Planck
Eynclopedia of International Law, Vol IX (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 652-58; N.W.
Barber, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity,” European Law Journal 11 (2005): 308-25; Andreas
Føllesdal, “Subsidiarity and Democratic Deliberation,” in Democracy and the European Union:
Integration through Deliberation, ed. Erik Odvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum (London:
Routledge, 1999), 85-110; Andreas Føllesdal, “Survey Article: Subsidiarity,” Journal of Political
Philosophy 6 (1998): 190-218.
24 See e.g., Fabbrini, “The Margin of Appreciation and the Principle of Subsidiarity: A
Comparison”; Cassese, “Ruling Indirectly—Judicial Subsidiarity in the ECHR.”
25 See e.g., Mowbray. “Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human Rights”; Fabbrini,
“The Margin of Appreciation and the Principle of Subsidiarity: A Comparison.” For a more nuanced
position, F.J. Mena Parras, “From Strasbourg to Luxembourg? Transposing the Margin of
Appreciation Concept into EU Law,” Centre Perelman de philosophie du droit, Working Paper 7/
2015. http://www.philodroit.be/IMG/pdf/fm_transposing_the_margin_of_appreciation_concept_
into_eu_law_-_2015-7.pdf.
26 See e.g., Shelton, “Subsidiarity and Human Rights Law”; Carozza, “Subsidiarity as a
Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law.” For a historical explanation of the
connection, see Julien Barroche, “Subsidiarite´,” in DicoPo, Dictionnaire de the´orie politique (2007)
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In this article, I would like to argue that the concept of subsidiarity is
at play in international human rights law, but that the structure, function and
justification of human rights subsidiarity are very different from those of the
other conceptions of subsidiarity we know of in other contexts. To grasp it,
we need to go back to the relationship between human rights and (democratic)
domestic politics and, accordingly, to the role of international human rights
law and its complementary relation to domestic human rights law. The
proposed argument is three-pronged. After a first section on subsidiarity in inter-
national human rights law where I identify the different shapes it takes in
practice (I.), the second section compares human rights subsidiarity so identified
with the conceptions of subsidiarity encountered in other political and legal
contexts, and does so with respect to the different dimensions of subsidiarity:
its subjects, objects, functions, tests, justifications, limits and review (II.). The
third section draws various implications of the specificity of human rights sub-
sidiarity for how we should go about interpreting some of its dimensions in
practice (III.).
A final methodological caveat is in order. The article is part of a more general
project of developing a legal theory of human rights.27 Starting from legal ques-
tions and categories, it proposes an interpretation of international human rights
law. Concretely, in this case, starting from the practice of subsidiarity in interna-
tional human rights law, however multidimensional and contradictory it may
seem at first sight,28 the article seeks to identify the principle of subsidiarity at
play and to interpret it comparatively and critically in a way that fits and justifies
that normative practice. This means identifying both the justifications and cri-
tiques underpinning the practice of subsidiarity in international human rights law,
in order to present the existing law and practice in its best light. Like any legal
interpretation, the proposed interpretation of human rights subsidiarity is con-
strained and shaped by the normative practice of law, but it is also part of that
practice and hence constrains and shapes it in return. So-doing, the theory of
human rights subsidiarity I propose is not trapped in the kind of normatively inert
descriptions of human rights practice one finds in some so-called “political”
theories of human rights,29 on the one hand, but it is not freed from that practice
and from having to account for it as are the kind of practice-guiding normative
accounts of moral human rights one finds in some so-called “ethical” human
rights theories,30 on the other.
http://www.dicopo.fr/spip.php?article61; Julien Barroche, Etat, libe´ralisme et christianisme—Critique
de la subsidiarite´ europe´enne (Paris: Dalloz, 2012).
27 See e.g., Samantha Besson, “The Law in Human Rights Theory,” Journal for Human Rights 7
(2013): 120-50; Samantha Besson, “Legal Human Rights Theory,” in Blackwell Companion to
Applied Philosophy, ed. David Cody, Kimberley Brownlee, and Kasper Lipper-Rasmussen
(London: Blackwell Wiley, forthcoming 2016).
28 See also Nicholas W. Barber, “The Significance of the Common Understanding in Legal Theory,”
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35 (2015): 799-823.
29 See e.g., Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009).
30 See e.g., James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008).
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II. Human Rights Subsidiarity in Practice
This first section captures the practice of subsidiarity in international human
rights law and practice in order to prepare for its comparison, in the second
section, with the conceptions of subsidiarity at play in other legal and political
contexts. It does so, first of all, by identifying the context of human rights sub-
sidiarity and especially that of the complementary relationship between domestic
and international human rights law (A.); secondly, by identifying three types of
human rights subsidiarity in international human rights law (B.); and, finally, by
delineating human rights subsidiarity so identified from other related features of
international human rights law (C.).
A. Human Rights Subsidiarity in Context
Domestic international human rights law and international human rights law
relate in many ways that cannot be adequately captured solely by reference to
the principle of subsidiarity. It is important therefore to identify those relations as
the broader context for human rights subsidiarity, in order then to focus on
subsidiarity itself.
In the post-1945 contemporary human rights practice, human rights are pro-
tected both by domestic and international law. This dual human rights regime has
been famously described by Gerald Neuman as the “dual positivization” of
human rights.31 Constitutional and international human rights lawyers alike
have long been puzzled by the co-existence of these two legal regimes of
human rights and wondered about their relationship.
Clearly, the reason for this dual human rights regime does not lie in legal history
or genealogy as both types of legal human rights norms date back roughly to the
same post-1945 era. The so-called international “bill of rights,” i.e., the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), was drafted on the basis of existing domestic bills
of rights and at the same time, or shortly hereafter, most existing domestic bills of
rights or constitutions were either completely revised or drafted anew on the basis
of these international human rights treaties. This confirms the synchronic nature
of their functions and even a co-existence requirement.32 Nor does the reason for
their co-existence lie in the content or the structure of the human rights protected,
as those are held to be, by and large, similar in practice and should be so.33
International human rights law is not there to fill the gaps of domestic law, in
other words. Nor, finally, does the key to the relationship between domestic and
international human rights lie in their enforcement mechanisms. Both human
rights regimes should indeed be implemented and monitored by domestic
31 Gerald L. Neuman, “Human Rights and Constitutional Rights,” Stanford Law Review 55 (2003):
1864.
32 See also Stephen Gardbaum, “Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights,” European
Journal of International Law 19 (2008): 764 ff.
33 Gardbaum, “Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights,” 750-51.
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institutions, before the potential supervision by the international machinery of
collective enforcement established by IHRL.34
So, what could explain that the two regimes are not merely juxtaposed, and
hence concurrent or redundant at best? They have, I have argued elsewhere,
distinct albeit complementary functions that make them dependent on one an-
other.35 The complementarity of the functions of domestic and international
human rights law actually explains how they arise together and cannot be sepa-
rated in their law-making process and sources. These features correspond to what
I have referred to elsewhere as the mutual validation and legitimation of domestic
and international human rights law.36 International human rights stem from the
transnational consolidation of domestic human rights in democratic States and
constrain the latter in return.
In a nutshell, the international or externalized human rights law regime has
three functions that make it complementary to domestic human rights law:37 (i) a
substantive one: it requires the protection of the minimal and abstract content of
those rights against domestic levelling-down;38 (ii) a personal one: it requires the
minimal inclusion of all those subjected to domestic jurisdiction, territorially and
extra-territorially and whether they are nationals or not, in the personal scope of
those rights;39 and (iii) a procedural one: it requires the introduction of minimal
internal institutional, and especially judicial, mechanisms of implementation of
those rights and monitoring/review thereof that are complemented by some form,
whether judicial or political, of international and hence external human rights
monitoring.40
It is the third relationship of complementarity between domestic and interna-
tional institutional mechanisms of monitoring or review that is captured by the
idea and principle of (“procedural”) subsidiarity in practice. Of course, traces of
the other two dimensions of complementarity between international and human
rights law are also to be found in the ways in which human rights subsidiarity
applies, and especially in what I will refer to as “substantive” subsidiarity. Note,
however, that human rights subsidiarity is always institutional, and hence pro-
cedural, to the extent that all types of subsidiarity qualify the reviewing compe-
tence of international human rights institutions and courts, even if this then takes
different shapes depending on whether it pertains to their power to review
34 See Samantha Besson, “Human Rights and Constitutional Law: Mutual Validation and
Legitimation,” in Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, ed. Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao,
and Massimo Renzo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 279-99. See also Ronald Dworkin,
Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 333-4; Kristen Hessler,
“Resolving Interpretive Conflicts in International Human Rights Law,” Journal of Political Philosophy
13 (2005): 37.
35 See Besson, “Human Rights and Constitutional Law.” See also Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs,
334-5.
36 See Besson, “Human Rights and Constitutional Law”; Samantha Besson, “The Sources of
International Human Rights Law,” in Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2017).
37 See Besson, “Human Rights and Constitutional Law.”
38 See Gardbaum, “Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights,” 764.
39 Ibid., 765-6, 767.
40 See also Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 334-5.
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(“procedural subsidiarity”), to the latter’s intensity (“substantive subsidiarity”) or
to its scope (“remedial subsidiarity”).
B. Three Types of Human Rights Subsidiarity
A descriptive survey of international human rights law and practice shows that
human rights subsidiarity is usually approached as a two-sided principle: States
have the primary responsibility to secure human rights under their jurisdiction,
and international human rights institutions have a complementary review power
in cases where international minimal human rights standards are not protected
effectively domestically.41 More specifically, the survey reveals three types of
human rights subsidiarity: “procedural,” when it pertains to the actual power
or competence of the international human rights court or body to review (i.);
“substantive,” when it qualifies the intensity of that review (ii.); and “remedial,”
when it pertains to the scope of the review (iii.).
Because the application of the principle of subsidiarity in international human
rights law has developed through practice and especially judicial practice and has
not (yet) been entrenched in the text of international human rights instruments,
those three types of subsidiarity and their distinct labels are mostly doctrinal
reconstructions of that practice.42 They have, however, been recently vindicated
by judicial practice itself.43 Further, independently from the exact categories and
labels, they are all regarded as derivations of the same principle of subsidiarity by
international human rights courts or bodies in practice.44 I will come back to the
central question of the conceptual unity of subsidiarity and of the comparative
conceptual belonging of human rights subsidiarity in the next section.
Interestingly, it is within international human rights law regimes that are judi-
cialized, like the ECHR or the 1969 American Convention of Human Rights
(with its Court, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights [IACtHR]), that one
encounters all three types of human rights subsidiarity.45 In other international
human rights regimes, the general rule seems to be that the less institutionalized
41 See e.g., “ECtHR Background paper, Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided Coin?,” 1.
42 See e.g., Samantha Besson, “Human Rights Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication—
Putting Domestic Courts as International Law Adjudicators in Perspective. In International Law
and ..., ESIL Proceedings of the 10th Anniversary Conference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forth-
coming 2016); Samanth Besson, “The ‘Erga Omnes’ Effect of Judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights—What’s in a Name?,” in La Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme apre`s le Protocole
14: premier bilan et perspectives (Zurich: Schulthess, 2011), 125-75.
43 See e.g., “ECtHR Background paper, Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided Coin?,” 3-7.
44 See e.g., “ECtHR Background paper, Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided Coin?,” 3-7.
45 The other international human rights courts or bodies considered are the IACtHR (another
regional international human rights court) and the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (two UN human rights treaty
bodies). The former is a regional international human rights court like the ECtHR albeit in another
region. The HRC is the international human rights treaty body that comes closest to the ECtHR in
terms of the rights protected, and the CERD is the eldest UN human rights treaty body. Note that
this article’s argument does not draw a distinction between regional and universal international
human rights’ instruments: they are all international in nature and, as a result, equally complemen-
tary to domestic (democratic) human rights law. It would be wrong therefore to conceive of the
relations between regional and universal international human rights bodies’ or courts’ review as being
based on subsidiarity. On these relations and the transnational consolidation of international human
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they are, the less subsidiarity is invoked and respected. Thus, while some forms of
subsidiarity may be identified in the practice of UN human rights treaty bodies,
very few subsidiarity requirements subsist in individual procedures before the
Human Rights Council. A second observation is that, even before human
rights treaty bodies, if procedural subsidiarity is usually respected, it is not the
case with substantive subsidiarity or only in a very limited fashion,46 and clearly
not the case with remedial subsidiarity. This may be explained by reference to the
lack of legally binding force of these bodies’ views and observations, but also, a
contrario, by reference to the specificities and importance of judicial reasoning in
the human rights context.
i. Procedural Subsidiarity
Procedural subsidiarity pertains to the power or competence to review of an
international human rights court or body. It derives from and confirms, at least
negatively, the primary procedural, and especially judicial, responsibility of States
in the monitoring and reviewing of the implementation of international human
rights law (e.g., arts. 1, 13, 19 and 52 ECHR)47. More specifically, procedural
subsidiarity founds the two following requirements, or “rules,”48 for an interna-
tional human rights body or court to be able to exercize its complementary
review: first of all, the exhaustion of (effective) domestic remedies (e.g., art.
35(1) ECHR) and, secondly, respect for the further admissibility conditions for
an application before the ECtHR (e.g., art. 1, 34 and 35 ECHR).49
Under the ECHR system, the first requirement of procedural subsidiarity is the
obligation to exhaust domestic remedies under art. 35(1) ECHR. The Court
stated in Vucˇkovic´ and Others v. Serbia that “the rule of exhaustion of domestic
remedies is based on the assumption—reflected in Article 13 of the Convention,
with which it has close affinity—that there is an effective [domestic] remedy
available in respect of the alleged violation. The rule is therefore an indispensable
part of the functioning of this system of protection.”50 Art. 35(1) ECHR requires
that the complaints brought to the ECtHR should have first been made to the
appropriate domestic body and, further, that any procedural means that might
prevent a breach of the Convention should have been exhausted. Applicants are
not, however, required to invoke the Convention right relied on expressly in the
domestic proceedings. It is enough that they have raised the issue in substance or
implicitly.51 Moreover, only those domestic remedies deemed “effective” have to
rights law, more generally, see Samantha Besson, “Human Rights as Transnational Constitutional
Law,” in Handbook on Global Constitutionalism (London: Elgar, forthcoming 2017).
46 See e.g., HRC, General Comment No. 34 (CCPR/C/GC/34, 2011), par. 36.
47 See e.g., Kudla v. Poland, ECHR 2000-XI 197 (CE:ECHR:2000:1026JUD003021096), par.
152; Austin and Others v. United Kingdom, ECHR 2012-II 423 (CE:ECHR:2012:
0315JUD003969209), par. 61. See also Keller and Mu¨ller, “Das Zusammenspiel von
Bundesgericht und EGMR.”
48 See e.g., Vucˇkovic´ and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection), App no 17153/11 et. al. (ECtHR,
25 March 2014, CE:ECHR:2014:0325JUD001715311), par. 69.
49 See e.g., “ECtHR Background paper, Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided Coin?,” 3-4.
50 Vucˇkovic´ and Others v. Serbia, par. 69.
51 Azinas v. Cyprus, ECHR 2004-III (CE:ECHR:0428JUD005667900), par. 38.
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be exhausted and the Court has interpreted this autonomous notion very
broadly.52
A second set of requirements of procedural subsidiarity may be found in the
other admissibility rules under arts. 1, 34 and 35 ECHR. One may mention two
in particular: the six-month time-limit for an individual application, that will be
reduced to four months once Protocol 15 is in force (art. 4), and the prohibition
of actio popularis through the requirement that the applicant should be a “concrete
and individual victim” (art. 34 ECHR) of the alleged violation of human rights.
The former aspect ensures that review by the ECtHR can occur sufficiently close
in time to the actual violation of the Convention. The latter ensures that its review
is concrete and does not involve or lead to the abstract judicial review of domestic
legislation, because this is a competence that remains solely in the domestic
sphere.
ii. Substantive Subsidiarity
Substantive subsidiarity qualifies the intensity and content of the review the inter-
national human rights court or body may exercise once the conditions imposed by
procedural subsidiarity are fulfilled and it is allowed to exercise its review power. It
includes two so-called jurisprudential “doctrines” or “rules”53 (as they have been
developed e.g., by the ECtHR): first, the fourth-instance doctrine and, second,
the margin of appreciation of domestic authorities. Substantive subsidiarity is also
understood as underpinning a third rule: the principle of favor.
First of all, under the fourth-instance doctrine, the ECtHR considers that it has
only limited power to review that facts have been assessed correctly and that
domestic law has been well interpreted and applied. It is not its role to take
the place of national courts, thereby becoming a kind of fourth instance,54 but
only to ensure that the decisions of these courts are not flawed by arbitrariness or
otherwise manifestly unreasonable.55 It is only when the assessment of facts and
law by domestic courts may itself amount to a breach of the ECHR that the
Court’s review will extend into these areas. It remains unclear, however, from the
ECtHR’s case-law when this should be the case, on the one hand, and what the
arbitrariness control should amount to exactly, on the other.56 The fourth instance
doctrine operates mostly in a judicial context.57
Secondly, the margin of appreciation doctrine is the most prominent jurispru-
dential derivation from substantive subsidiarity.58 The connection between the
52 Akdivar v. Turkey, ECHR 1996-IV (CE:ECHR:1996:0916JUD002189393), par. 69. See also
Tulkens, “Conclusions ge´ne´rales.”
53 See e.g., “ECtHR Background paper, Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided Coin?,” 5-7.
54 See e.g., Eckle v. Germany, ECHR (1982) Series A no 51 (CE:ECHR:1982:0715
JUD000813078), par. 66.
55 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, ECHR 2007-I 39 (CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901),
par. 83.
56 See e.g. Dembele´ v. Switzerland, App no 74010/11 (ECtHR, 24 September 2013,
CE:ECHR:2013:0924JUD007401011). See also Judge Keller’s dissenting opinion, par. 18-23.
57 Austin and Others v. United Kingdom, par. 61.
58 See Letsas, “Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation”; Letsas, “The Margin of Appreciation
Revisited.”
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two was first made by the ECtHR in the Handyside v. United Kingdom case59, and
has now been confirmed by art. 1 Protocol 15.60 The margin of appreciation
doctrine recognizes that there may be a range of different but justified interpret-
ations of international human rights law depending on the domestic context. As a
result, the Court should defer to the judgment of domestic authorities that are
better placed to decide on what these are. That deference or self-restraint is not
absolute, of course, or else the review and supervision power of the Court would
be pointless.
The degree of stringency of the Court’s review should vary depending
on the degree of the margin of appreciation which national authorities enjoy.
Regrettably, however, the scope, width and limits of States’ margin of appreci-
ation still remain unclear in the ECtHR’s case-law.61 The Court also refers
interchangeably to the “cases,” “scope” or “factors” affecting the margin of
appreciation.62
In terms of scope, the margin of appreciation mostly—but not exclusively—
applies to restrictions to human rights and, as a result, especially to human rights
balancing. One can also find cases where the margin of appreciation is mentioned
in relation to the determination of the scope and content of human rights.
Importantly, the margin of appreciation does not only protect domestic judicial
review. It also acknowledges the weight to be attached to the democratic process
and the range of options that may be available to the domestic legislature when
complying with the Convention.63 There seems to be a limit in the case-law,
however: the margin of appreciation only applies provided domestic (judicial,
legislative or executive) authorities can prove they have reasoned about the
ECHR rights at stake and have offered reasons for their position.64
In terms of width or degree, the margin of appreciation is broad in two types of
cases: first of all, cases where there is no “European consensus” and hence no
common or converging approach among States Parties65 and, secondly, cases that
pertain to morally or politically sensitive rights.66 The first group of cases include
cases pertaining to issues about which there is persistent and widespread reason-
able disagreement among and within European States and hence no consensus
59 Handyside v. United Kingdom, par. 48-50.
60 See e.g., Spielmann, “Whither the Margin of Appreciation?”; Spano, “Universality or Diversity of
Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity.”
61 See e.g., Dubout, “La proce´duralisation des droits”; Gerards, “Pluralism, Deference and the
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine”; Kratochvı´l, “The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation”;
Letsas, “Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation.”
62 See e.g., “ECtHR Background paper, Subsidiarity: A Two-Sided Coin?,” 5-7. See also S. and
Marper v. United Kingdom, ECHR 2008-V 213 (CE:ECHR:2008:1204JUD003056204), par. 102.
63 Animal Defenders International v. United Kingdom, ECHR 2013-II 203
(CE:ECHR:2013:0422JUD004887608), par. 115-116. See Matthew Saul, “The European Court
of Human Rights’ Margin of Appreciation and the Processes of National Parliaments,” Human Rights
Law Review 15 (2015): 745-74.
64 See e.g., Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, ECHR 2010-IV 409 (CE:ECHR:2010:0624
JUD003014104), dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens; A v. Norway, App
no 28070/06 (ECtHR, 9 April 2009, CE:ECHR:2009:0409JUD002807006), par. 74. See also
Spano, “Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity,” 12.
65 See Wildhaber, Hjartarson, and Donnelly, “No Consensus on Consensus?”
66 See Føllesdal, “Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation.”
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about a minimal European standard yet.67 This applies in particular, but not only,
to personal sphere rights (arts. 8-11 ECHR). The second group of cases includes
cases that pertain to art. 15 ECHR derogations,68 but also by extension to the
general positive duty of democratic States to organize themselves so as to protect
human rights. This includes political and democratic rights in particular. There
are variations, however, depending on the area: there is usually a lesser margin of
appreciation with respect to restrictions to political speech than to commercial
speech, given how important the former is in a democracy by comparison to the
latter.69 It is interesting to note from these two factors influencing the width of the
margin of appreciation in practice that the existence of European consensus does
not necessarily preclude the recognition of a broad margin of appreciation of
States, and vice-versa.
Finally, in terms of limits, there are some rights in relation to which the margin
of appreciation has been excluded by the ECtHR. This is the case with violations
of absolute ECHR rights (e.g., art. 3 ECHR),70 in particular, but also with the
fundamental core of ECHR rights. Another case of exclusion or serious limitation
of the margin of appreciation has been violation of non-discrimination rights (art.
14 ECHR).71
Thirdly, the principle of favor (e.g., art. 53 ECHR) captures the idea that
international human rights standards are minimal and not maximal standards.
According to that principle, ECHR rights should not be interpreted as preventing
domestic authorities from setting and implementing higher standards of protec-
tion than those of ECtHR’s case-law. The ECtHR’s substantive review should
therefore focus mostly on the enforcement of that minimal level of protection.
The principle has not been invoked much in practice, however, nor interpreted in
detail by the ECtHR, as a result.72
iii. Remedial Subsidiarity
Remedial subsidiarity protects the States’ choice of remedial means after an ad-
verse judgment of an international human rights body or court. Remedial sub-
sidiarity is an extension of procedural and substantive subsidiarity73 to the extent
67 See e.g., Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece, ECHR 2012-II 279
(CE:ECHR:2012:0315JUD004220207).
68 See e.g., A and Others v. United Kingdom, ECHR 2009-II 137 (CE:ECHR:2009:0219
JUD000345505), par. 174.
69 Contrast e.g., Goodwin v. United Kingdom, ECHR 1996-II (CE:ECHR:1996:0327JUD
001748890) or Perinc¸ek v. Switzerland, ECHR 2015 (not published yet) (CE:ECHR:2015:
1015JUD002751008) with Mouvement rae¨lien suisse v. Switzerland, ECHR 2012-IV 373
(CE:ECHR:2012:0713JUD001635406), par. 61.
70 See e.g., Saadi v. Italy, ECHR 2008-II 145 (CE: ECHR:2008:0229JUD003720106).
71 See e.g., Fabris v. France, ECHR 2013-I 425 (CE:ECHR:2013:0207JUD001657408), par. 72.
72 See e.g., Catherine van de Heyning, “No Place like Home: Discretionary Space for the Domestic
Protection of Fundamental Rights,” in Human Rights Protection in the European Legal Order:
Interaction between European Courts and the National Courts, ed. Patricia Popelier, Catherine van
de Heyning, and Piet Van Nuffel (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2011), 65-96.
73 See e.g., “ECtHR Background paper, Implementation of the judgments of the European Court
of Human Rights: a shared judicial responsibility?,” European Court of Human Rights. http://www.
echr.coe.int/Documents/Seminar_background_paper_2014_ENG.pdf.
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that a condemnation by an international human rights body or court gives rise to
new human rights duties that have to be specified and implemented in priority by
domestic authorities given their primary responsibility and discretion in the im-
plementation of human rights in the first place.
In the ECHR system, remedial subsidiarity is based on art. 46(1) ECHR and
the ECtHR’s interpretation of the principle of restitutio in integrum. According to
it, adverse judgments of the Court are declaratory (albeit being binding, of course)
and do not identify or specify remedies for the violation identified. Adverse
judgments of the Court therefore call for some form of domestic remedial en-
forcement that has to be determined by States themselves. As a result, States
Parties have the responsibility to identify the best means to comply with the
secondary duties stemming from the recognition of their international responsi-
bilities (art. 19/46(1)/52 ECHR). That responsibility gives rise to duties to cease
the violation, prevent further violations and remedy the consequences of the
violation.74
In recent years, remedial subsidiarity has become more and more under threat
in the ECtHR’s case-law, especially in the Court’s struggle against the lack of
enforcement of its judgments by domestic authorities.75 For mostly political rea-
sons, this problem has not been remedied by the Committee of Ministers, al-
though it is officially in charge of the ex post monitoring of the enforcement of the
Court’s judgments (art. 46(2) ECHR). In reaction, but also in prevention, there-
fore, the Court has started to specify States’ remedial duties in its judgments. It
has done so ex ante in its adverse judgments themselves, but has also started
monitoring their enforcement ex post through its judgments on a second appli-
cation pertaining to the same case. It has done the former, of course, in pilot
judgments whose point is precisely to address structural problems in States Parties
and to specify how they should go about resolving them in other cases.76
However, the Court has also specified individual and general remedial measures
in other individual cases.77 As to ex post monitoring, the Court has started
requiring States Parties that have established revision procedures under domestic
law to use them after an adverse judgment by the Court.78
C. Human Rights Subsidiarity Delineated
Even when one focuses on their procedural or institutional dimensions, there are
relations between international and domestic human rights institutions that
74 See Besson. “The ‘Erga Omnes’ Effect of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights”;
Lambert, The Execution of Judgments; Ruedin, L’exe´cution des arreˆts.
75 See for a constructive critique, Helen Keller and Cedric Marti, “Reconceptualizing
Implementation: The Judicialization of the Execution of the European Court of Human Rights’
Judgments,” European Journal of International Law 26 (2016): 829-50.
76 Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, ECHR 2006-VIII 57 (CE:ECHR:2006:0619JUD003501497),
par. 232.
77 See Assanidze v. Georgia, ECHR 2004-II 221 (CE:ECHR:2004:0408JUD007150301).
78 See Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no 2), ECHR 2009-IV 57
(CE:ECHR:2009:0630JUD003277202); Emre v. Switzerland (no 2), App no 5056/10 (ECtHR,
11 October 2011, CE:ECHR:2011:1011JUD000505610).
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should not be confused with relations of subsidiarity. A few delineations are in
order, therefore.
First of all, human rights subsidiarity, especially in its procedural dimension,
should not be conflated with the principles of litispendence and res judicata.
These principles condition the jurisdiction of international human rights bodies
and courts (e.g. art. 35(2)(b) ECHR). Unlike subsidiarity, they apply to the
relationship between international bodies or courts themselves, and not to their
relationship to domestic authorities.
Secondly, human rights subsidiarity, especially in its substantive dimension,
requires deference to the review of domestic authorities. It should not be confused
with the protection of the discretion of States in specifying and implementing
human rights duties in their local circumstances in the first place.79 Human rights
duties actually have to be specified in context depending on the concrete threats to
the interest protected by the rights.80 As a result, States having jurisdiction over
the right-holders are the only ones able to specify their own human rights duties
in their respective domestic circumstances.81 This is actually why the margin of
appreciation of States derived from human rights subsidiarity should not be too
quickly identified with the “margin of appreciation” of States in general interna-
tional law.82 The latter consists in their having discretion in the implementation
of their international legal duties domestically. In the human rights context, that
discretion is necessary, however, and cannot therefore amount to something that
could be bypassed or reversed, whereas this would be the case were it to be
equated with States’ margin of appreciation and its potential limitations under
the principle of subsidiarity.
Thirdly, human rights subsidiarity, especially in its substantive dimension,
should not be confused with the stringency of human rights (duties).83
Substantive subsidiarity, and especially the margin of appreciation, implies adapt-
ing the degree of stringency of the ECtHR’s scrutiny, but not of the duties arising
from human rights themselves. These duties vary depending on the concrete
79 See also Letsas, “The Margin of Appreciation Revisited.”
80 There is nothing about human rights discretion in the specification of human rights’ duties that
threatens their universality. On the contrary, the content of human rights’ duties can only be specified
by and in the domestic institutional context where they are owed and where the specific threats to the
protected interests occur and can be identified. See also Føllesdal, “Appreciating the Margin of
Appreciation”; Letsas, “The Margin of Appreciation Revisited”; Samantha Besson, “Justifications
of Human Rights,” in International Human Rights Law, 2d ed. Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, and
Sandesh Sivakumaran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 34-52. Contra: Brems, “The Margin
of Appreciation Doctrine”; Eyal Benvenisti, “Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal
Standards,” NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 31 (1999): 843-54. On the moral epis-
temology of human rights and their transnational legal practice, see Besson, “Human Rights as
Transnational Constitutional Law.”
81 See Samantha Besson, “The Extra-territoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to,” Leiden Journal of
International Law 25 (2012): 857-84.
82 Contra: Yuval Shany, “Towards a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Law?,” European Journal of International Law 16 (2005): 907-40; Eirik Bjorge, “Been There, Done
That: The Margin of Appreciation and International Law,” Cambridge Journal of International and
Comparative Law 4 (2015): 181-90.
83 See also Kratochvı´l, “The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation.”
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threats to the human right at stake and the interest protected by the right. It does
not depend on whether or not the ECtHR has the competence to review domestic
authorities’ decisions, on the one hand, and, more importantly, on what intensity
of scrutiny it applies in that review, on the other. Of course, in practice, when the
margin of appreciation applies to a case where the stringency of a duty is at stake,
the lack of review or its limited scrutiny may be taken as an ex post confirmation of
the domestic determination of the stringency of the duty.
Finally, human rights subsidiarity, especially in its substantive dimension, dif-
fers from principles of justification of a restriction on human rights, and in
particular from proportionality.84 Human rights’ restrictions may be deemed
justified or not independently from the margin of appreciation of a State Party,
and the latter does not constitute a justification for such a restriction. Hence the
distinction made by George Letsas between the general (and correct) “procedural”
or “structural” notion of the margin of appreciation, that is at stake in this article,
and a more “substantive” one pertaining to the proportionality of a restriction
that has nothing to do with it –and with human rights subsidiarity more gener-
ally.85 Of course, in practice, when the margin of appreciation applies to a case
where a domestic restriction of human rights and its justifications are contested,
the limited review by the international human rights body or court confirms the
domestic justification of the restriction ex post and hence its assessment of pro-
portionality, as a result.
III. Human Rights Subsidiarity in Comparison
Based on the proposed account of human rights subsidiarity in practice, we are
now in a position to compare it with the various conceptions of subsidiarity one
can identify in other contemporary political and legal contexts (a.).86 This com-
parison of various conceptions of subsidiarity is best done horizontally, i.e.,
84 See Letsas, “Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation,” 81-2; Christos L. Rozakis, “Through
the Looking Glass: An ‘Insider’s’ View of the Margin of Appreciation,” in La Conscience des Droits:
Me´langes en l’honneur de Jean-Paul Costa (Paris: LGDJ, 2011), 527-37.
85 Ironically, Letsas’s understanding of the “procedural” or “structural” margin of appreciation is
usually captured as an application of “substantive” or “material” subsidiarity as it is understood here.
This is because subsidiarity is always institutional and hence procedural to the extent that all its types
pertain to the reviewing competence of international human rights institutions and courts (its ex-
istence, intensity and scope). For a critique of the term “substantive” to refer to subsidiarity, however,
see Dubout, “La proce´duralisation des droits.”
86 Two caveats are in order. First, this article focuses solely on contemporary conceptions of sub-
sidiarity. On the history of the principle in Greek and Medieval political thought, and in particular in
the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Althusius, Aquinas or Kant, see e.g., Føllesdal, “The Principle of
Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International Law”; Szymczak, “Rapport introductif: le
principe de subsidiarite´ dans tous ses e´tats”; Barroche, “Etat, libe´ralisme et christianisme”; John
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Second,
the article focuses on the political or legal practice of subsidiarity, and not on its other social or
religious uses. Of course, there are interesting historical ties to uncover between the different con-
ceptions based on their genealogy (e.g., Barroche, “Subsidiarite´”), but what matters here is the
interpretation and justification of the contemporary legal principle of human rights subsidiarity
by reference to the other contemporary legal conceptions of subsidiarity at play.
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through a comparative review and discussion of the different dimensions of sub-
sidiarity across its various contexts (b.).87
The comparison of human rights subsidiarity with other conceptions
of subsidiarity amounts to an exercise in (normative-) conceptual analysis
and interpretation.88 What underpins this comparison is the presupposition
that there actually is a single concept or principle of subsidiarity whose
conceptions can differ along various dimensions. Instead, one could, of course,
consider that the conceptions of subsidiarity at play in those different con-
texts are so diverse that they actually correspond to different concepts
altogether.89 In this article, however, I consider that there is, besides common
language, sufficient commonality (and not just enough agreement to disagree over
subsidiarity!) in the different uses of subsidiarity to vindicate the proposed
approach.90
In a nutshell, what seems to be common to all the conceptions of subsidiarity is
the minimal two-pronged principle that, first of all, the individual/smaller/lower/
internal unit or entity should have priority (or so-called “primarity”) in doing
certain things and that, secondly, this priority may or should be reversed only
when the individual/smaller/lower/internal unit or entity cannot do so, or not
sufficiently well, and/or when the collective/larger/higher/external one can do so
better. This minimal understanding captures (i) the two-step functioning of sub-
sidiarity and (ii) its two-party or relational structure.91 For the rest, depending on
the various dimensions of subsidiarity selected, and on their multifarious potential
combinations across contexts or even in a single context, the different conceptions
of the principle can vary hugely, as we will see.
Of course, the existence of a minimal common concept of subsidiarity does not
mean that what goes by the name of subsidiarity in international human rights
law actually is a form of subsidiarity. It is the aim of this section, therefore, to
assess, by normative-conceptual comparison, whether the minimal two-pronged
concept of subsidiarity is at play in the three types of human rights subsidiarity
identified in the previous section from practice, on the one hand, and to what
extent its conception differs from conceptions of subsidiarity we know from other
legal and political contexts, on the other.
87 Instead, other studies of subsidiarity in general or in the human rights context have chosen a
vertical approach, context by context or conception by conception. See e.g., Mowbray, “Subsidiarity
and the European Convention on Human Rights”; Føllesdal, “The Principle of Subsidiarity as a
Constitutional Principle in International Law”; Barber, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity.” As I
will argue, however, the various dimensions of subsidiarity can be mixed and matched in so many
different ways that it is difficult to identify a single conception at play in one single context and it is
better therefore to unpack these conceptions into their different dimensions.
88 On the analysis of normative concepts and especially moral and legal ones like subsidiarity, see
also Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana Press, 1986).
89 I thank Leslie Green for this point.
90 See also Føllesdal, “The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International
Law”; Barber, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity,” 309.
91 It should in particular cover both functional and territorial uses of subsidiarity depending on
whether the units or entities are territorially delimited or merely functional ones.
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A. Contexts of Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity may be encountered in a great variety of political and
legal, and hence institutional contexts. To some extent albeit not exclusively,92
these contexts determine some of the other dimensions of subsidiarity and should
be discussed first, therefore.
Among contemporary contexts of subsidiarity, the eldest conception of the
principle of subsidiarity, as it is currently used, may be traced back to the
Catholic Church’s social doctrine of subsidiarity (subsidiarii officii principium).
The Catholic social doctrine of subsidiarity now also applies by extension to any
forms of social and political governance—and even arguably only to them and not
the Church itself. It considers that individuals or the smaller groups (e.g., a
family) in a social or political body should be the ones deciding on their interests
and acting, including and mainly against State intervention.93 A second context of
subsidiarity is one of technical-economic organization, inspired by the 19th
Century liberal doctrine. In that context, subsidiarity becomes a utilitarian prin-
ciple of organization according to which the local level of decision-making maxi-
mizes efficiency.94 A third context is that of federal polities, whether national or
supranational, and hence a political form or organization.95 This is clearly the case
of subsidiarity in the post-war traditions of federalism prevailing in Germany and
Switzerland. A fourth context of subsidiarity, that is related to all the former, is the
EU’s (art. 5(3) TEU), and hence an integrated and supranational political and
legal order.96 Finally, at least for now, a fifth context is that of international legal
regimes and/or institutions that exercise public authority over individuals such as
WTO law or environmental law, and hence supranational legal regimes.97
92 There are hybrid conceptions of subsidiarity, of course, and some dimensions may overlap be-
tween its conceptions. Thus, the German federalist doctrine of subsidiarity has been influenced by
Catholic social doctrine; Catholic social doctrine has transformed from a form of Aristotelian nat-
uralism into a modern kind of jusnaturalism in the context of its application to human rights in the
20th Century; EU law subsidiarity is a combination of German federalist subsidiarity and liberal-
organizational subsidiarity; and so on. See also Barroche, “Subsidiarite´.”
93 See e.g., Chantal Million-Delsol, L’Etat subsidiaire (Paris: PUF, 2010); Finnis, Natural Law and
Natural Rights, 146-47. See also in the ECHR context, Maria Cahill, “The Origin of Anti-
Subsidiarity Trends in the Regulation of the Family,” International Journal of the Jurisprudence of
the Family 4 (2013): 85-114.
94 See e.g., Willem Molle, The Economics of European Integration—Theory, Practice, Policy, 4th ed.
(London: Ashgate, 2001), 23-5. See also Barroche, Etat, libe´ralisme et christianisme, 563.
95 See e.g., Daniel Halberstam, “Federal powers and the principle of subsidiarity,” in Global
Perspectives on Constitutional Law, ed. Vikram Amar and Mark Tushnet (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 34-47.
96 See e.g., Vlad Constantinesco, “Le principe de subsidiarite´: un passage oblige´ vers l’Union
europe´enne?,” in L’Europe et le droit. Me´langes en hommage a` Jean Boulouis, (Paris: Dalloz, 1991),
35-45; Renaud Dehousse, “La subsidiarite´ et ses limites,” in Annuaire europe´en, vol. 40 (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), 27-46; Antonio Estella, The European Union Principle of Subsidiarity and its
Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Barber, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity.”
97 See e.g., Benvenisti, “Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards”; Shany,
“Towards a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?”; Bjorge, “The
Margin of Appreciation and International Law”; Alexia Herwig, “Federalism, the EU and
International Law: on the Possible (and Necessary) Role of Subsidiarity in Legitimate Multilevel
Trade Governance,” in Federalism in the European Union, ed. Elke Cloots, Geert De Baere, Stefan
Sottiaux (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), 65-82.
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Human rights law may be compared with the other contexts of subsidiarity to
the extent that, like them, it has both a legal and an institutional context.
Subsidiarity applies to the ECHR, for instance, and especially to its implemen-
tation by domestic institutions, whether legislative, executive or judicial, on the
one hand, and the ECtHR, on the other. Importantly, however, the ECHR is not
an autonomous legal system or order. Nor is there an independent polity (e.g., the
Council of Europe’s) constituted by it. To that extent, the context of human rights
subsidiarity is not that of an encompassing legal or political system including
different equivalent units albeit at different levels of decision-making. Human
rights subsidiarity differs therefore in this fundamental respect from subsidiarity
in EU law or in a federal entity or order.
B. Dimensions of Subsidiarity
The different dimensions of subsidiarity used to develop a normative-conceptual
analysis and interpretation of human rights subsidiarity in this section are: its
subjects (i.), objects (ii.), functions (iii.), justifications (iv.) tests (v.), limits (vi.),
and review (vii.).
i. Subjects of Subsidiarity
The two relevant subjects or units of subsidiarity can vary a lot from one con-
ception of subsidiarity to the next. They actually differ between contexts of sub-
sidiarity, even though the relevant subjects need not be mutually exclusive and
may overlap within each context.
First of all, subjects of subsidiarity can be States, but also sub-national or
supranational political entities in general. This is clearly the case in the federal
context where subsidiarity applies between the federal State, or central political
entity, and the federated entities or provinces/States. It is also the case in the EU
where subsidiarity applies between the EU and its Member States. Secondly,
subjects of subsidiarity may be individuals or groups of individuals (e.g., a
family). This is the case in the Catholic social doctrine of subsidiarity98 or in
certain liberal-economic doctrines of subsidiarity. Finally, subjects of subsidiarity
may be institutions, and especially courts or monitoring bodies within a State or
political entity or even outside them. This is the case in the international legal
context where subsidiarity is usually applied to international judicial or monitor-
ing bodies of some kind independently from their belonging to a larger political
unit.
Human rights subsidiarity does not apply between States or political entities or
between institutions inside a State or political entity, or at least not only. It
applies, more precisely, between States and their legislative, executive or judicial
institutions, and mostly the latter actually, on the one hand, and international
human rights monitoring bodies, whether judicial or political, and mostly judicial
actually, on the other. Thus, it may encompass a relationship between a domestic
98 See e.g., Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 146-7; Cahill, “The Origin of Anti-Subsidiarity
Trends.”
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judge and an international judge, but not only. Most of the time, it is a relation-
ship between a domestic authority in general with an international judge.99 For
instance, the ECtHR refers to the subjects of subsidiarity being, on the one hand,
the “Convention mechanism” or the “international machinery of collective en-
forcement established by the Convention” and, on the other, “national
authorities”.100 Importantly, in 2009, the Court stressed in A and Others v.
United Kingdom that substantive subsidiarity does not transpose onto the domes-
tic legal order and does not therefore apply to relations between domestic autho-
rities. Indeed, “the doctrine of the margin of appreciation has been meant as a tool
to define relations between the domestic authorities and the Court. It cannot have
the same application to the relations between the organs of State at the domestic
level.”101
Finally, human rights subsidiarity does not apply to individuals or groups of
individuals (e.g., the family). It may do so by extension, of course, in particular
through the discretion of States in their domestic implementation of positive
human rights duties in private contexts such as family life or the economic
sector. However, when it does, it is only an indirect consequence that depends
on States’ own political and constitutional traditions and in particular on whether
or not the latter recognizes individuals or groups of individuals as subjects of
subsidiarity. Such an application of subsidiarity to individuals or groups of indi-
viduals does not directly flow from international human rights law; the latter only
binds States and international human rights bodies’ or courts’ review only pertains
to States’ implementation of human rights and their respective review of that
implementation.102 As a result, human rights subsidiarity applies exclusively to
States and their relations to international monitoring bodies or courts.
Of course, human rights are rights of individuals (and, sometimes, groups of
individuals). To that extent, some may conclude to their being the primary sub-
jects of subsidiarity. This is, at least, what some human rights theorists working in
the field of Catholic social doctrine could argue.103 However, human rights are
equal rights that are owed qua human rights duties by all right-holders together as
a political community of public equals, i.e., the democratic State. This explains in
turn why human rights duty-bearers can and should only be institutional and,
actually, democratic-political entities.104 There can and should be no horizontal
99 See e.g., Animal Defenders International v. United Kingdom, par. 115-116.
100 See SAS v. France, par. 129; Case “relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in
education in Belgium” v. Belgium, par. 10.
101 See A and Others v. United Kingdom, par. 184.
102 See, however, the dissenting opinions of Judges Zupancic, Gyulumyan, Kalaydjieva, De Gaetano
and Wojtyczek in O’Keeffe v. Ireland, ECHR 2014 (not published yet) (CE:ECHR:2014:0128
JUD003581009), par. 7 and the concurring opinion (but on other grounds) of Judge Wojtyczek
in Sindicatul ‘Pastorul Cel Bun’ v. Romania, ECHR 2013-V 41 (CE:ECHR:2013:0709
JUD000233009), par. 2. For a discussion of this recent trend, see Mowbray, “Subsidiarity and the
European Convention on Human Rights.”
103 See e.g., Cahill, “The Origin of Anti-Subsidiarity Trends,” 112-3; Shelton, “Subsidiarity and
Human Rights Law,” 10-11.
104 See e.g., HRC, General Comment No 26 on Continuity of Obligations, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.8/Rev. 1 (1997), par. 4. See Samantha Besson, “The Bearers of Human Rights’ Duties
and Responsibilities for Human Rights: A Quiet (R)Evolution?,” Social Philosophy & Policy 32
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effect of human rights and no private duties arising from them, as a result. To that
extent, there is no place in human rights subsidiarity for non-institutional sub-
jects, and hence for individuals’ own determination and supervision of their
human rights or, for that matter, for private groups’ such as families or churches
other than the State. It would actually be paradoxical to want to apply the anti-
Statist traits of some versions of the Catholic social doctrine of subsidiarity105 to
human rights subsidiarity. The latter’s main object of protection is indeed State-
based implementation of human rights.
ii. Objects of Subsidiarity
The objects of subsidiarity can be of different kinds. They actually vary a lot from
one context to the next, even though the different objects need not be mutually
exclusive and may overlap.
First of all, subsidiarity may pertain to sovereignty or political autonomy. This
is the case when sovereignty is understood as an ensemble of competences or
powers. A second and more common object of subsidiarity is authority or the
claim to rule, and sometimes even legitimate authority and the right to rule. In
the latter case, subsidiarity can actually work as a justification of authority, as we
will see. This application of subsidiarity to authority is common in the federal
context, although it need not necessarily work as a justification of authority.
A third and even more common object of subsidiarity consists in powers or
competences, of a legislative, executive or judicial kind, provided they are not
exclusively pre-allocated. This is the object of subsidiarity under art. 5(3) TEU. A
fourth object of subsidiarity can be law itself, including legal duties and respon-
sibilities. Finally, a fifth object of subsidiarity can be any aim or objective.
In the context of human rights subsidiarity, there is no sovereignty or authority
at stake, unlike what applies in the context of autonomous legal and political
systems like the EU or a federal State. Rather, the object of subsidiarity is a
(judicial or not) competence or power to monitor or review. International
human rights monitoring institutions do not indeed have any other competence
to specify and implement human rights for this is exclusively a domestic compe-
tence. This applies at least to the international side of subsidiarity, for the do-
mestic object of subsidiarity can be any legislative, executive or judicial activity
and extends beyond monitoring or review. A first conclusion then is that human
rights subsidiarity is not strictly a matter of delineating international from do-
mestic (judicial) reviewing competence. It pertains rather to the relationship be-
tween a complete institutional competence regarding human rights at domestic
level, on the one hand, and an international monitoring or reviewing competence,
on the other.
As a matter of fact, strictly speaking, human rights subsidiarity may not be
solely a matter of (review) competence. Indeed, international human rights law
(2015): 244-268; Samantha Besson, “The Allocation of Anti-poverty Rights Duties—Our Rights,
but Whose Duties?,” in Poverty and the International Economic Legal System—Duties to the World’s
Poor, ed. Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 408-31.
105 See Barroche, “Subsidiarite´.”
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does not pertain to vesting domestic institutions with competences. It is rather
about generating duties and responsibilities to the extent that domestic institu-
tions have a general positive duty to organize themselves so as to be able to
exercise their legislative, executive or judicial activities to implement their specific
human rights duties. Of course, this includes a duty for them to set up domestic
judicial review and grant the latter reviewing competences under domestic human
rights law (e.g., art. 13 ECHR). Importantly, however, this does not, conversely,
turn human rights subsidiarity into a subsidiarity of duties or responsibilities
where some would be “primary” and others “secondary,” and human rights
responsibilities would merely be devolved to international institutions when sub-
sidiarity applies. There are no human rights duties or responsibilities of interna-
tional human rights institutions stricto sensu.
So, this makes for an interesting contrasted object of human rights subsidiarity:
an international judicial or institutional monitoring or reviewing competence, on
the one hand, and a domestic positive duty to respect and protect human rights
that includes a duty to allocate a domestic judicial competence of decision and
review, on the other. As a result, human rights subsidiarity is not about either
competences106 or responsibilities107 only.
iii. Functions of Subsidiarity
The functions of subsidiarity can be of different kinds. They actually vary a lot
from one context to the other and may be in tension with one another, even
though the different functions need not be mutually exclusive and may overlap.
First of all, subsidiarity may be about providing justification or title, and in
particular constitute a ground for the legitimacy of authority or competences.
This justificatory function of subsidiarity applies in the context of Catholic social
doctrine, for instance. Of course, at a minimum and qua principle, subsidiarity
always has a normative function, giving rise to rights, duties, liabilities or powers
of the subjects of subsidiarity.
Secondly, subsidiarity may have as a function to allocate its objects, whether
authority or competences. It is the case, in particular, in the federal context where
competences, that are not exclusively pre-allocated, get allocated concretely in
each case by reference to subsidiarity. Subsidiarity in its allocating function may
be transitive and work both ways (upwards and downwards, as it were) or be
downwards only, depending on whether it is only the collective/larger/higher/
external unit that abides by it or both that one and the individual/smaller/
lower/internal one. In most cases, it will be restricted to the unidirectional up-
wards allocation of competence. The downwards direction is often described as
the deferral or devolution of competences; it actually comes closer to decentral-
ization (that is another feature of federalism) than to subsidiarity.108 A third
function of subsidiarity also pertains to competences, but instead of allocating
106 Contra: Fabbrini, “The Margin of Appreciation and the Principle of Subsidiarity: A
Comparison.”
107 Contra: Spielmann, “Whither the Margin of Appreciation?”
108 See Barroche, “Subsidiarite´.”
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them, subsidiarity regulates their exercise. This is the function of subsidiarity in
EU law in cases where the EU is not exclusively competent and where both the
EU and its Member States share a competence. Again, both a unidirectional and a
bidirectional approach may be taken depending on the cases, although it is usually
unidirectional and upwards in direction.
Finally, subsidiarity’s function may be to sequence the exercise of a competence
or duty. In such cases, there is no allocation to either of the two subjects of
subsidiarity, since both of them have and exercise the competence or duty at
stake, but do so in a given order and to a given degree. What subsidiarity does,
when it sequences, is set the order and degree in and to which both subjects
decide, giving the priority to one over the other albeit allowing both to decide in a
complementary fashion in the end, unless the priority is reversed and the collect-
ive/larger/higher/external subject is allowed to decide, either first or all over again.
Importantly, there are many different normative implications of subsidiarity in
those different functions. An important distinction is between subsidiarity work-
ing as a Hohfeldian power/disability pair and subsidiarity working as one may
refer to as a duty/privilege pair. In the former case, when the priority of the
individual/smaller/lower/internal unit is reversed in favor of the collective/
larger/higher/external one, the power/disability opposition is flipped. In the
latter case, however, subsidiarity gives rise to a duty of the collective/larger/
higher/external unit when the priority of the individual/smaller/lower/internal
one is reversed. This distinction is often captured as one between “negative”
and “positive” subsidiarity depending on whether the reversal of priority gives
rise to a power or to an actual duty. The former is the most common one,
especially present in the liberal-organizational theories discussed before and ac-
cording to which any social or political intervention is resisted. The latter, by
contrast, is used in some Catholic doctrines of subsidiarity that regard social or
political intervention as potentially beneficial to individual autonomy.109 Note
that this positive/negative subsidiarity distinction should not be conflated with
another one that pertains to the subsidiarity test, as I will explain next. There, a
distinction is drawn between the individual/smaller/lower/internal unit being
unable to decide (negative test) and the collective/larger/higher/external unit
being able to do so (positive test). In some versions of subsidiarity, both are
needed, as in EU law. In most cases, however, the negative test is the sole one
to lead to the reversal of priority. Finally, one often encounters a third use of the
distinction between negative and positive subsidiarity: it captures the opposition
between the priority of domestic authorities and the reversal of that priority in
favor of international ones as one between the negative and positive dimensions of
subsidiarity.110
The function of human rights subsidiarity is primarily the sequencing of a
judicial monitoring or reviewing competence, and not the allocation of a single
competence to review or of the exercise of that competence. Indeed, even when
subsidiarity applies, both domestic and international human rights institutions
109 See e.g., Shelton, “Subsidiarity and Human Rights Law,” 5.
110 See e.g., Barroche, “Subsidiarite´.”
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and/or courts are competent to review and can actually exercise their competences
in all cases (provided an individual applicant makes an application). However,
what subsidiarity requires is that international human rights institutions exercise
their competence to review only once domestic remedies have been exhausted
(procedural subsidiarity; sequencing in exercise) and only to a limited degree and
scope (substantive and remedial subsidiarity; sequencing in degree and content).
This explains why some authors refer to human rights subsidiarity as “comple-
mentary subsidiarity” as opposed to “competitive subsidiarity” which is most
common among other conceptions of subsidiarity.111 This association of
human rights subsidiarity with complementarity actually fits the complementarity
of the functions of international human rights law presented in the first sec-
tion.112 It also corresponds better to the Latin concept of subsidium which implies
help or assistance rather than subordination or secondariness.113
Importantly, whether human rights subsidiarity pertains to sequencing the ex-
ercise of judicial reviewing competences or their degree, it is unidirectional and
downwards only. It cannot be used by domestic authorities or courts to defer the
exercise of their review to international human rights institutions or courts. The
former are presumed to know better what the local circumstances are and this is
what is needed to specify and apply human rights. However, and it is related,
there is no positive test or second prong in the test of effectiveness to the extent
that the international human rights’ body or court is presumed to have the cap-
acity to complement and assist once it has the power to do so.
iv. Justifications of Subsidiarity
The justifications of subsidiarity can be of different kinds. They actually vary a lot
from one context to the next and may even be in tension with one another, even
though the different justifications need not be mutually exclusive and may over-
lap. The justification of the principle of subsidiarity amounts to its source or the
reasons for having that principle.114
111 See e.g., Joe¨l Andriantsimbazovina, “La subsidiarite´ devant la Cour de justice des Communaute´s
europe´ennes et de la Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme,” Revue des affaires europe´ennes 1-2
(1998): 28-9; Szymczak, “Rapport introductif: le principe de subsidiarite´ dans tous ses e´tats,” 27.
112 Identifying subsidiarity and complementarity may be a source of confusion for international
lawyers, however, given how the latter is used in international criminal law to preclude endorsing a
subsidiarity-like exhaustion of local remedies and to adopt an either/or approach to criminal juris-
diction. This is actually paradoxical because the either/or allocation of judicial competence through
“complementarity” in international criminal law comes closer to the function of other conceptions of
subsidiarity than it does to the ones of human rights subsidiarity. Retrospectively, it is a shame
therefore that, because art. 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute was drafted well after the term “subsidiarity”
had been chosen in EU and ECHR law, the term “complementarity” was chosen instead (see e.g.
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1575650.pdf, par. 47).
113 On the etymology of the 20th Century substantive term “subsidiarity” (in German, French and
English), see Barroche, “Subsidiarite´.”
114 When the function of subsidiarity is normative and is therefore to justify its object (authority,
competences or duties and their allocation), as discussed before, the justifications of the principle of
subsidiarity become justifications of justifications, as it were, and hence potentially regressive. Such
justificatory regresses are not unknown in morality, however, and especially among intermediary
principles. This actually includes many other principles within international human rights law, such
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A first justification for the principle of subsidiarity can be individual autonomy
(and, by extension, human well-being) that requires being able to participate
when one can.115 This is a justification one encounters in the context of the
Catholic social doctrine of subsidiarity, although other justifications such as epi-
stemic or democratic ones, presumably by derivation, are often put forward in
that context too.116
A second justification that turns the first one into a more collective one is self-
determination,117 and the protection against tyranny. It is difficult to see how self-
determination alone could justify the priority of the individual/smaller/lower/
internal unit, however, for the size of the unit is irrelevant to self-determination.
Accordingly, a variation of this justification one often encounters, thirdly, is cul-
tural or national identity. This is a justification one finds in the federal context,
and especially the multinational or multicultural political context.118 Fourthly,
democratic sovereignty or democracy in general is often mentioned as an add-
itional qualification or a justification of subsidiarity in the collective and political
context. More specifically, it is the democratic requirement that those who are
most affected by a decision should be included in the decision-making process
that is invoked to justify subsidiarity. Another democratic argument is egalitarian,
however, and has to do with choosing the decision-making unit that gives people
the most voice.119 Of course, as many authors have argued, democracy alone
cannot constitute an argument for the relevant decision-making unit in a given
polity120 and, by extension, for subsidiarity qua allocating or sequencing principle
between the relevant units.121 Interestingly, the second, third and fourth justifi-
cations are all collective variations of the first justification of subsidiarity, i.e.,
individual autonomy or self-determination.
A fifth, and very different, justification for subsidiarity is the maximization of
economic efficiency. This is the justification for subsidiarity one encounters in the
liberal-organizational approach. A final justification is epistemic capacity. This is
shared by other justifications and present in many conceptions of subsidiarity,
including in the liberal-economic approach, the federal context or even EU law,
where the justification for the priority of the domestic exercise of competences is
that domestic authorities know better.
as proportionality, for instance. See on human rights as relations of justification, Besson,
“Justifications of Human Rights.”
115 See e.g., Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 146-7 and 169 (“the principle of subsidiarity is a
principle of justice”).
116 See e.g., Shelton, “Subsidiarity and Human Rights Law,” 5-7. This combination of democratic
and personalist justifications for subsidiarity, especially in favor of personal autonomy, may also be
found in Judge Wojtyczek’s opinion in Sindicatul ‘Pastorul Cel Bun’ v. Romania, par. 2.
117 See e.g., Shelton, “Subsidiarity and Human Rights Law,” 5.
118 For a critique, see Barber, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity.”
119 See e.g., Shelton, “Subsidiarity and Human Rights Law,” 6.
120 See e.g., Frederick G. Whelan, “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem,” in
Nomos XXV: Liberal Democracy, ed. J. Roland Pennick and John W. Chapman (New York: NYU
Press, 1983), 13-47.
121 See Barber, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity”; Føllesdal, “The Principle of Subsidiarity as a
Constitutional Principle in International Law.”
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In international human rights law, justifications brought forward for human
rights subsidiarity tend to be two-fold: epistemic and democratic. This is has been
confirmed by the ECtHR that refers to domestic authorities’ being “better placed
than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions”, on the one
hand, and to reasonable disagreement and the special weight that should be given
accordingly to the democratic domestic policy-maker, on the other.122 This com-
bination of justifications for human rights subsidiarity is interesting because it
reveals a certain ambivalence between an organizational approach and a more
normative one regarding the object, the function and the test of human rights
subsidiarity.123 This ambivalence may be explained by the multiple combinations
of conceptions of subsidiarity at play in Europe across different contexts and,
arguably, within the same one like the EU. From a democratic theory perspective,
however, the combination is not surprising in the light of the epistemic justifica-
tions often put forward for democratic procedures themselves.124 The epistemic
justification is even stronger in the human rights case given the concrete nature of
human rights duties whose content can only be specified in domestic circum-
stances; this is the only context in which the threats to the interest protected by a
given human right can be assessed and the potential corresponding duties and
their egalitarian dimensions identified.125 As I explained before, however, the test
for the effectiveness of the minimal human rights’ protection is not epistemic to
the extent that the domestic authorities are presumed to know better and that the
second prong of the principle of human rights’ subsidiarity does not entail a
positive condition that the international human rights’ body or court can better
protect them.
Importantly, the democratic justification of human rights subsidiarity should
not be mistaken with other democratic justifications of subsidiarity.126 To that
extent, it does not fall prey to the criticism made to the latter either. Because, as I
explained before, human rights subsidiarity does not apply to competing political
entities, democratic subsidiarity is not a matter of giving priority to one over the
other depending on how well they contribute to the protection of either equality
or the all-affected principle. There is only one political entity whose democracy is
at stake in the human rights context, and it is that of every State implementing
international human rights law. What justifies sequencing the monitoring or re-
viewing competence of an international human rights body or court is not its
democratic credentials as a court, therefore: it is not the body or court of a more
122 See SAS v. France, par. 129.
123 See Dubout, “La proce´duralisation des droits.” See also Barber, “The Limited Modesty of
Subsidiarity” with respect to subsidiarity in EU law.
124 See e.g., Jose´ L. Martı´, “The epistemic conception of deliberative democracy defended: reasons,
rightness and equal political autonomy,” in Deliberative Democracy and Its Discontents, ed. Jose´ Luis
Martı´, Samantha Besson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 27-56.
125 See Besson, “The Allocation of Anti-poverty Rights Duties—Our Rights, but Whose Duties?”;
Samantha Besson, “The Egalitarian Dimension of Human Rights,” Archiv fu¨r Sozial- und
Rechtsphilosophie Beiheft 136 (2012): 19-52.
126 Contra: Shelton, “Subsidiarity and Human Rights Law,” 6-7.
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encompassing democratic polity.127 On the contrary, what justifies its comple-
mentary review and limited intensity is the protection of domestic democracy—
and, as a matter of fact, of human rights themselves, as I will explain.
Indeed, and more specifically, the democratic justification of human rights
subsidiarity resides in well-known mutual relationships in constitutional theory:
the mutual or constitutive relationship between human rights and democracy, one
the one hand, and between human rights, democracy and judicial review, on the
other. The additional complexity in international human rights law is that, among
the three elements in the triangle, human rights and judicial review are both
domestic and international, while democracy remains solely national.128
First of all, the relationship between democracy and human rights. It is the
egalitarian dimension of human rights qua rights of everyone and, conversely, the
human rights-constituted nature of basic equality that explains how human rights
and equality are mutually constitutive. In turn, because democracy is grounded in
equality, having a democratic regime is a requirement of human rights by virtue of
the mutuality of constitution between human rights and equality.129
The mutuality between human rights and equality, and its implications for the
relationship between human rights and democracy account for two movements
one may observe in international human rights law. First of all, they explain why
human rights should be identified and specified through egalitarian and hence
democratic procedures. This is actually confirmed by international human rights
law and its requirement that States be organized democratically. Thus, the
ECHR’s Preamble refers to the reliance of human rights protection on “effective
political democracy.” The ECtHR’s case-law itself states that democracy and, to
date, domestic democracy is the only regime where the equality of human rights-
holders can be respected.130 The relationship between democracy and human
rights also accounts for why the latter may be restricted solely through democratic
procedures and by reference to equality as emphasized, for instance, by the con-
ditions of restriction of the par. 2 of art. 8-11 ECHR. Secondly, and conversely,
human rights should also work as a way to set egalitarian limits on democracy.
A confirmation of this may be found in both non-discrimination rights and the
fundamental core of each human right, for they protect the basic equality of
individuals against restrictions through democratic decisions.
Where does international human rights law fit into this picture of mutual
constitution between democracy and human rights? As I argued before, its role
is complementary and minimal, and not redundant to that of domestic human
127 On supranational human rights review and its differences from domestic constitutional review
from a democratic perspective, see Samantha Besson, “European Human Rights, Supranational
Judicial Review and Democracy—Thinking Outside the Judicial Box,” in Popelier et al., Human
Rights Protection in the European Legal Order: Interaction between European Courts and National
Courts, 97-145.
128 See Samantha Besson, “Human Rights and Democracy in a Global Context—Decoupling and
Recoupling,” Ethics and Global Politics 4 (2011): 19-50.
129 See Besson, “The Egalitarian Dimension of Human Rights.”
130 See e.g., Zˇdanoka v. Latvia, ECHR 2006-IV 29 (CE:ECHR:2006:0316JUD005827800), par.
98; Baczkowski and others v. Poland, App no 1543/06 (ECtHR, 3 May 2007, CE:ECHR:2007:0503
JUD000154306), par. 61.
S. Besson96
 at U
niversite de Fribourg on June 22, 2016
http://ajj.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
rights law. It protects and entrenches an external and minimal guarantee of both
democracy and human rights from outside the democratic polity. International
human rights law protects “the right to have human rights” domestically.131 To
that extent, its guarantees are substantively subsidiary to domestic human rights
law; the latter is developed and interpreted democratically before it becomes
sufficiently transnational to be entrenched as an international standard and to
bind domestic human rights law in return.132
Second, the relationship between human rights, democracy and judicial review.
Given the mutual constitution and tension between democracy and human rights,
constitutional review has developed as a way to protect both basic equality and the
human rights that constitute it. It protects equality and human rights against the
proceduralization of equality through democratic procedures, on the one hand,
and, conversely, equality and democracy against the essentialization of human
rights, on the other. It is by no means an easy balance to preserve, but constitu-
tional review is the mechanism constitutional democracy has developed to protect
equality. This explains why setting up domestic mechanisms of judicial review of
domestic law, including democratic legislation of course, is actually a requirement
of international human rights law as exemplified by art. 13 ECHR. This is also
one of the background conditions for the application of subsidiarity and the
sequential “primarity” of domestic review, as I explained before.
Where does international human rights institutions or courts’ review fit into
this picture of mutual constitution between human rights, democracy and judicial
review? Like international human rights law, its role is complementary and min-
imal. It ensures an external review of the domestic review that occurs outside of
the democratic polity, and to that extent is substantively and procedurally sub-
sidiary to domestic human rights adjudication that is democratically embedded
through the separation of powers. This relationship between art. 13 ECHR and
the primary domestic duty to organize domestic judicial review of domestic
human rights implementation, on the one hand, and the subsidiarity of the
competence of judicial review of the ECtHR, on the other, has been stressed
many times by the Court itself.133 International or supranational judicial
review in the human rights context should not therefore be equated with anti-
majoritarian judicial review in a domestic constitutional democracy.134
In sum, human rights subsidiarity finds its justification in the egalitarian and
hence democratic dimension of human rights, and as a result in human rights
131 See Besson, “Human Rights and Constitutional Law”; Besson, “Human Rights and Democracy
in a Global Context.”
132 Of course, human rights are what institutions say they are and the difference between domestic
and international human rights law is actually one between their institutional interpretations by
domestic and international human rights courts and bodies. See also Hessler, “Resolving Interpretive
Conflicts in International Human Rights Law”; Samantha Besson, “The Legitimate Authority of
International Human Rights: On the Reciprocal Legitimation of Domestic and International
Human Rights,” in The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Regimes, ed. Andreas Føllesdal,
Johan Karlsson Schaffer, Geir Ulfstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 32-83.
133 Vucˇkovic´ and Others v. Serbia, par. 69; Kudla v. Poland, par. 148 and 155.
134 See also Besson, “European Human Rights, Supranational Judicial Review and Democracy.”
Contra: Føllesdal, “Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation”; Benvenisti, “Margin of Appreciation,
Consensus, and Universal Standards.”
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themselves.135 This egalitarian justification of subsidiarity explains how central
the principle of subsidiarity has become in international human rights law. It also
explains why it is a self-standing jurisprudential principle within ECHR law and
one that has grown out of the ECtHR’s case-law. Rather than revert to equality
and democracy every time, it has been easier for the Court to identify a middle-
ground, structural or organizational principle like subsidiarity to capture the in-
stitutional or structural consequences of the human rights-equality-democracy
triangle for its power of review.
Interestingly, the democratic justification of human rights subsidiarity explains
how the closer a human rights issue pertains to democracy, the more important
subsidiarity becomes, and especially substantive subsidiarity. This is confirmed by
the international human rights practice, and in particular the ECtHR’s low level
of scrutiny in matters pertaining to political matters in general.136 More generally,
the importance of the existence or emergence of a European transnational con-
sensus for the reduction of the margin of appreciation corresponds to the recog-
nition of the importance of the democratic implementation and development of
human rights in all European States. Hence the link made repeatedly by the
ECtHR between reasonable disagreement and the margin of appreciation of do-
mestic democratic authorities.137 Conversely, the democratic justification of
human rights subsidiarity also accounts for the inherent democracy-based and
egalitarian limitations to subsidiarity, in particular to the margin of appreciation,
and especially non-discrimination rights or the inner or fundamental egalitarian
core of each human right.138
v. Tests of Subsidiarity
The tests or criteria of subsidiarity can be of different kinds. They actually vary a
lot from one context to the other and especially from one justification to the other
and may be in tension with one another, even though the different tests need not
be mutually exclusive and may overlap.
In short, the subsidiarity test, when negative, leads to the reversal of the priority
of the individual/smaller/lower/internal unit or entity in favor of the collective/
larger/higher/external one. The primary and most widespread test is one of ef-
fectiveness. The point of the test is to assess the ability of the individual/lower/
smaller/internal unit to fulfill its duties, reach its objectives (e.g., art. 5(3) TEU)
135 Unlike Letsas, “The Margin of Appreciation Revisited,” I do not see that the margin of appre-
ciation and the ECtHR’s deference to domestic authorities undermine the egalitarian dimension of
human rights, which I endorse like him. Reasonable disagreement about our human rights, and hence
about what makes us equal, calls for the democratic determination of our rights. So, the difference
between his account and mine resides in the relationship I see between human rights (and equality)
and democracy (and by extension judicial review). See also Besson, “European Human Rights,
Supranational Judicial Review and Democracy”; Besson, “The Egalitarian Dimension of Human
Rights.”
136 See e.g., Baczkowski and others v. Poland, par. 61; Refah Partisi v. Turkey, ECHR 2003-II 267
(CE:ECHR:2003:0213JUD004134098); Mathieu-Mohin Clerfayt v. Belgium; ECHR (1987) Series
A no 113 (CE:ECHR:1987:0302JUD000926781); Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece.
137 See SAS v. France, par. 129.
138 See e.g., Sejdic´ and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECHR 2009-VI 273 (CE:ECHR:2009:1222
JUD002799606).
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or implement its competences. This test is, of course, largely empty and needs to
be filled in by reference to the object of subsidiarity (e.g., specific duties, objectives
or competences). The full realization or effectiveness of most of them remain
largely indeterminate, however, and their determination a matter of appreciation.
This then passes the buck of the test of subsidiarity back to its justification to flesh
out the criterion of effectiveness. Effectiveness is the subsidiarity test that applies
in EU law, and this explains an important part of the criticism expressed against
subsidiarity in EU law and, charitably put, its “modesty.”139 It also applies in
other contexts such as the liberal-organizational context (where it usually takes the
shape of efficiency, though), the federal one and even Catholic social doctrine140.
In all those contexts, therefore, what does the work in the subsidiarity test is(are)
the justification(s) of subsidiarity.
In the assessment of effectiveness, a distinction is often drawn between the
individual/smaller/local/internal unit being unable to do something (negative
test) and the collective/larger/higher/external unit being able to do so (positive
test). In some versions of subsidiarity, both tests are needed as it is the case in EU
law (art. 5(3) TEU), while, in most conceptions, the negative test is the sole one
that can lead to the reversal of priority. Interestingly, when both positive and
negative effectivities are required, the subsidiary test usually turns into a propor-
tionality test. Hence their frequent association in practice (e.g., their juxtaposed
treatment in art. 5(4) TEU and in the EU’s Protocol on subsidiarity and pro-
portionality). Of course, this may become problematic once the object of sub-
sidiarity itself is to review the proportionality of a given measure as this implies a
regress in proportionality. Last but not least, subsidiarity is not a matter of degree
and is not incremental.141 The positive and negative subsidiarity tests by reference
to a proportionality assessment should not therefore be understood so as to in-
dicate the existence of degrees of subsidiarity.
In the human rights context, the prima facie test used for human rights sub-
sidiarity is the effectiveness in the domestic protection of the minimal interna-
tional standard of human rights. While effectiveness is an aim of international
human rights law and a duty of States under the latter, it is difficult to see how it
can be used on its own as a test for substantive subsidiarity. The minimal content
of a human rights duty and hence the effectiveness of its respect are indeed deeply
indeterminate in circumstances of reasonable disagreement.142 Thus, deciding on
it outside of the democratic process begs the question of the egalitarian justifica-
tion of human rights and of how to protect it. At the same time, of course, there
should be a way of determining a minimal international standard of human rights
protection that does not simply amount to giving entirely into domestic evalu-
ations. The latter would undermine the whole complementarity between
139 See Barber, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity”; Barroche, Etat, libe´ralisme et christianisme.
140 See e.g., Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 146-7.
141 It is not because substantive subsidiarity pertains to the degree of review of an international
human rights body or court that subsidiarity itself is a matter of degree, as we will see later. The same
may be said about the intensity of the margin of appreciation: its greater or smaller intensity does not
imply more or less subsidiarity.
142 See Besson, “Human Rights and Democracy in a Global Context.”
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international and domestic human rights law. It would also threaten the coherence
of international human rights law and hence equality in and before international
human rights law.
This may actually explain why other proxies for minimal human rights stand-
ards need to be at play in practice, especially in the context of the determination
of the scope (and width) of the margin of appreciation of domestic authorities.
One may think, for instance, of the European consensus or “converging ap-
proach” criterion used by the ECtHR to identify what constitutes minimal
human rights protection across the States Parties and before selecting the corres-
ponding degree of scrutiny of a given domestic measure. Regrettably, this is not
the sole criterion or test at play in the Court’s reasoning when setting the margin
of appreciation, however, and its application remains largely unpredictable as a
result, as I explained in the first section (II.B.ii.).
Nevertheless, there are ways, I would like to argue, for the European consensus
test to be streamlined, generalized and used as a test for substantive subsidiarity,
besides the fourth-instance doctrine regarding factual assessments and evidence
and the principle of favor regarding what goes beyond the minimal human rights
standard, and within the egalitarian limits described in the next section. Referring
to the European democratic consensus as the minimal standard of human rights
protection corresponds to the democratic justification of human rights subsidiar-
ity. It matches the bottom-up development, alluded to before, of international
human rights standards from the transnational human rights practice of demo-
cratic States in Europe.143 It is the way to secure the democratic legitimacy of
international human rights institutions’ or courts’ review without, however, turn-
ing international human rights case-law into an incoherent and hence inegalitar-
ian patchwork of endorsements of individual domestic albeit democratic
specifications.144
On the proposed interpretation, international human rights courts do not work
as ultimate interpreters or umpires. To that extent, they are unlike other interna-
tional law courts whose interpretative authority derogates from the principle of
self-interpretation that prevails in international law. Instead, international human
rights courts, like the ECtHR, are facilitators of the self-interpretation of their
human rights law by democratic States: they help crystallize and consolidate
democratic States’ interpretations and practices of human rights and validate
the custom stemming from their subsequent practice under human rights trea-
ties.145 Once identified and entrenched as international (human rights) law
143 On the transnationality of the sources of human rights law, see Besson, “Human Rights and
Constitutional Law: Mutual Validation and Legitimation.”
144 Contra: Letsas, “The Margin of Appreciation Revisited”; Gerards, “The European Court of
Human Rights and National Courts.”
145 This is in line with art. 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the
so-called evolutive interpretation of treaties based on subsequent practice: ILC, Second Report by
Special Rapporteur Georg Nolte (A/CN.4/671, 2014), at 49 ff. See also Ineta Ziemele, “Customary
International Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights,” in The Judge and
International Custom—Proceedings of the Conference (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing,
2013), 75-83; Paul Mahoney, “The Comparative Method in Judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights: Reference Back to National Law,” in Comparative Law Before the Courts, ed. Guy
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through the international human rights courts’ case-law, the minimal human
rights interpretation can then be re-imposed on domestic authorities.146 This is
what is often referred to as the interpretative authority or erga omnes effect of an
international human rights court’s decision, an authority very different from an
autonomous and ultimate supranational interpretative authority.147
Of course, one may object that not all European States are democratic, and that
this jeopardizes the democratic argument for the European consensus and its use
as a test of substantive subsidiarity. This is a false problem given that all European
States Parties to the ECHR have to be democratic as much as they have to respect
human rights, and on grounds of the latter actually.148 Thus, first of all, their
consensus has to be incrementally democratic, just as they incrementally have to
protect human rights. Secondly, more specifically, when States have not ensured
sufficient democratic deliberation in a given human rights case, their margin of
appreciation should be limited or inexistent because the condition for the latter,
i.e. domestic reason-giving, is not fulfilled, as I explained before.149
Importantly, the existence or absence of European democratic consensus only
works as a test for human rights substantive subsidiarity within the egalitarian
limits of subsidiarity, i.e., provided non-discrimination rights and the fundamen-
tal core of human rights are not at stake. Conversely, and for the same democratic
reasons, setting aside the priority of domestic authorities, and especially reducing
their margin of appreciation, in cases that pertain to political rights, that are
therefore closely related to democracy, requires a strong degree of European
democratic consensus or, depending on the cases, may not even be justified in
certain rare cases.150 This accounts for the few cases I discussed in the first section
where the width of the margin of appreciation seems to be decoupled from
European consensus in the ECtHR’s case-law.
Last but not least, it is worth pausing to discuss a procedural alternative to the
regular effectiveness test of human rights subsidiarity that has been suggested by
Canivet, Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (London: British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, 2004), 135-50.
146 See Besson, “Human Rights Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication”; Besson, “The Sources
of International Human Rights Law.” On human rights interpretation in general, see e.g., Brigit
Schlu¨tter, “Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation by the UN Treaty Bodies,” in Human Rights
Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy, ed. Hellen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 261-319.
147 See Besson, “The ‘Erga Omnes’ Effect of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights,”
on the specificities of that authority and the inapplicability of international and constitutional
analogies.
148 Of course, what is constitutive of a democratic State is itself defined by the European consensus
crystallized through the ECtHR’s case-law. This explains in turn why there is no two-tier system in
the ECtHR’s case-law on the margin of appreciation depending on how democratic States are. See
also Føllesdal, “Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation.”
149 See also Føllesdal, “Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation.”
150 See e.g., Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece, par. 63-5; Podkolzina v. Latvia, ECHR 2002-
II 443 (CE:ECHR:2002:0409JUD004672699), par. 33; Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, ECHR 2008-
III 423 (CE:ECHR:2008:0708JUD001022603), par. 110. See also Samantha Besson and A.-L.
Graf-Bruge`re, “Le droit de vote des expatrie´s, le consensus europe´en et la marge d’appre´ciation
des Etats. Un commentaire de l’arreˆt Sitaropoulos et Giakoumopoulos c. Gre`ce,” Revue trimestrielle
des droits de l’homme 100 (2014): 953-4.
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Olivier De Schutter. He proposes to introduce a “presumption of effectiveness” of
human rights protection by domestic authorities that could be rebutted by an
international human rights body or court in case of “manifest deficiency.” This
would be developed mutatis mutandis on the basis of the presumption of equiva-
lence established by the ECtHR in the Bosphorus case and in favor of the EU.151
Besides the immediate institutional benefits for the backlog of the ECtHR,
such a presumption and its rebuttal would seem to be procedurally more deter-
minate and hence predictable than the current subsidiarity test of effectiveness. Of
course, the manifest deficiencies in human rights protection would still have to be
established and this could be regarded as just as indeterminate. There is another
more important objection, however. The presumption of equivalence was intro-
duced to take into account ECHR States Parties’ membership in international
organizations and the latter’s concurrent human rights regimes152 and hence in
order to ease their potential conflicts. By contrast, there is no “equivalence” to
look for between domestic and international human rights law, because, as I
explained before, they are not concurrent but complementary in functions.
This lack of equivalence also extends therefore to their corresponding judicial
institutions’ powers to review: there is simply no ground for a duty of equivalence
and hence for a presumption of equivalence between them. Both domestic autho-
rities and international human rights bodies should review: their review is com-
plementary and not alternative. International human rights review is not to be
dispensed through a presumption, as a result.
vi. Limits of Subsidiarity
The limits of subsidiarity can be of different kinds. They actually vary a lot from
one context to the other, even though the different limits need not be mutually
exclusive and may overlap.
The first limit on subsidiarity one could mention is the existence of an exclusive
or pre-allocated competence. This is the case in the federal context or in EU law
(art. 5(3) TEU). A second limit pertains to justice. This is a limitation familiar
from the Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity. Yet another kind of limits stems from
the justification(s) chosen for subsidiarity. For democracy, this would be equality.
This is also familiar in the federal context where subsidiarity is limited by refer-
ence to the protection of equality of the federal units.
In international human rights law, the limits to subsidiarity are those inherent
to democracy itself, i.e., equality-based limitations. The constitutive mutuality
151 See Olivier de Schutter, “The Two Lives of Bosphorus: Redefining the Relationships between the
European Court of Human Rights and the Parties to the Convention,” Journal europe´en des droits de
l’homme / European Journal of Human Rights 4 (2013): 584-524. See also Bosphorus Hava Yollar|
Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim S irketi v. Ireland, ECHR 2005-VI 107 (CE:ECHR:2005:0630
JUD004503698).
152 In the EU, for Bosphorus v. Ireland, in NATO for Gasparini v. Italy and Belgium, App no 10750/
03 (ECtHR, Decision of 12 May 2009, CE:ECHR:2009:0512DEC001075003) and in the UN, for
Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, App no 5809/08 (ECtHR, 26 November
2013, CE:ECHR:2013:1126JUD000580908).
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between human rights and equality explains how democracy can justify
equality-based limitations on human rights, while the latter can in turn justify
equality-based limitations on democracy. What this means for the limits on
human rights subsidiarity is that individual equality constitutes its limit. This
can take the shape of non-discrimination rights, but also, more generally, of the
prohibition of the erosion of the so-called inner or fundamental core of a given
human right and hence of the basic equality of its right-holder. This is confirmed
in the international human rights practice, and in particular by the ECtHR’s case-
law, as I explained before.
vii. Review of Subsidiarity
The mechanisms for the review of subsidiarity can be of different kinds. They
actually vary a lot from one context to the other, even though the different review
mechanisms need not be mutually exclusive and may overlap.
The primary and most common form of review of subsidiarity is centralized. It
can be vested in a judicial entity in the central unit, but also in legislative and
executive ones or in all of them if the review is diffuse. This is the case in the EU
where the main subsidiarity review has to take place at the Commission, but also
at every step of the EU law-making process, i.e. in the Parliament and the Council
as well. Respect for subsidiarity may also be reviewed by the CJEU. A second
form of review of subsidiarity is decentralized and extends the possibility of review
to individual/local/smaller/internal units. This is the case in the EU where, since
the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments, whether on their own, through their
Member States or the Committee of Regions, may review the respect of the
subsidiarity principle in EU law (see art. 263 par. 3 Treaty on the Functioning
of the EU [TFEU] and art. 8 EU Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality).
Subsidiarity review often implies reviewing a proportionality test. As I ex-
plained before, especially when the assessment of both positive and negative ef-
fectiveness is required, the subsidiary test usually implies a proportionality test. Of
course, this may become problematic when the object of subsidiarity is to review
the proportionality of a given measure, for the review of subsidiarity becomes not
only a review of a review, but also a proportionality-based review of a propor-
tionality-based review. Sometimes, it may even pertain to yet another proportion-
ality-based review domestically.
In the human rights context, the review of subsidiarity is not usually institu-
tionalized to the extent that international human rights bodies or courts are not
submitted to further review with respect to subsidiarity. Interestingly, the en-
trenchment of subsidiarity into the Preamble of the Convention by Protocol 15
is interpreted by some as a signal of the appropriation of subsidiarity by States and
potentially as enabling the review by the ECtHR of human rights subsidiarity in
the future.153 Some have even argued that the facilitation of Grand Chamber
153 See e.g., Sudre, “La subsidiarite´, ‘nouvelle frontie`re’ de la Cour europe´enne des droits de
l’homme”; Sudre, “Le recadrage de l’office du juge europe´en”; Tavernier, “La constitutionnalisation
de la marge d’appre´ciation.” Contra: Spielmann, “Whither the Margin of Appreciation?”, who argues
for the status quo after Protocol 15.
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referrals by Protocol 15 ECHR (art. 3), once it is in force, could be a way of
initiating an indirect review of human rights subsidiarity by the Court in its other
formations.154
What would make a review of human rights subsidiarity very difficult in any
case is that it would amount to a review of a review. Worse, it may even amount to
a review by the ECtHR of its own review of a review by a domestic court when
what is at stake is a human rights’ restriction. There is also an identity issue for it
is difficult to see how the very same court could be the reviewer of its own review
and, worse, of its own interpretation of what the principle of subsidiarity on
which that review is based amounts to.
IV. Human Rights Subsidiarity in Focus
The outcome of this exercise in comparative subsidiarity law has been that human
rights subsidiarity differs substantially from other conceptions of subsidiarity,
despite sharing key features of subsidiarity, and in particular its two-step func-
tioning and its two-party structure. It implies indeed, first, the priority not only of
the domestic application and interpretation of international human rights law but
also of its review and enables, second, the complementing of that domestic review
through international human rights review in the absence of effective protection
of the international minimal human rights standard in domestic law.
There are two implications of the specificity of human rights subsidiarity for
how we should interpret the concept of human rights subsidiarity in the future:
one negative and the other positive.
First of all, human rights subsidiarity should not be too quickly forced into the
boxes of other conceptions of subsidiarity that have different subjects, objects,
functions, tests, justifications and limits. This is in particular the case for analogies
with EU law subsidiarity, and the margin of appreciation of EU Member States
before the CJEU,155 or with federalist subsidiarity, and the indirect rule by federal
entities.156 Unlike human rights subsidiarity, both of them pertain to sovereign or
autonomous political entities and legal orders. Moreover, they concern general
competences and not (duties or powers to) review. Finally, they pertain to the
competitive allocation or exercise of these competences rather than the comple-
mentary sequencing of a power to review.
154 See e.g., the contrasting decisions on the European consensus and the width of the margin of
appreciation by the Chamber and Grand Chamber in Sitaropoulos v. Greece (Chamber judgment:
Sitaropoulos and Others v. Greece, App no 42202/07 [ECtHR, 8 July 2010, CE:ECHR:2010:
0708JUD004220207]; Grand Chamber judgment: see above Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v.
Greece) and in Lautsi v. Italy (Chamber judgment: Lautsi v. Italy, App no 30814/06 [ECtHR, 3
November 2009, CE:ECHR:2009:1103JUD003081406]; Grand Chamber judgment: Lautsi v.
Italy, ECHR 2011-III 61 [CE:ECHR:2011:0318JUD003081406]). See Sudre, “La subsidiarite´,
‘nouvelle frontie`re’ de la Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme.”
155 See e.g., Fabbrini, “The Margin of Appreciation and the Principle of Subsidiarity: A
Comparison.”
156 See e.g., Cassese, “Ruling Indirectly—Judicial Subsidiarity in the ECHR.”
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A second implication, more positive, is that the egalitarian and hence demo-
cratic justification of human rights subsidiarity should be developed further as
tool of interpretation of the various dimensions of human rights subsidiarity in
practice. This would help devise a clearer test of substantive subsidiarity in par-
ticular, but also clearer limits to subsidiarity in practice along the lines of what I
have proposed before.157 Of course, the ECtHR’s reasoning about the scope,
width and limits of the margin of appreciation of States, and especially the
European consensus test, has lacked coherence to this day. Once clarity has
been gained about human rights subsidiarity, however, and once the democratic
justification of the European consensus test for the identification of the minimal
European human rights standard and hence as a substantive subsidiarity test has
been provided, a lot of the confusions that prevail in the area could be more easily
dismissed.
This is important for human rights practice too as recent developments indicate
what one may regard as the growing “subsidiarity of subsidiarity” in international
human rights reasoning.158 In the ECtHR’s case-law, for instance, the focus seems
to have shifted entirely onto the primarity of domestic authorities’ duties and
responsibilities for human rights protection and especially on the pre-emptive
determination thereof.159 This goes further than merely focusing on the negative
aspect of subsidiarity and one of its two “sides” before turning to the other one,
i.e. the Court’s review power, its intensity and scope. It actually transforms sub-
sidiarity into an instrument for the pre-determination of the content of States’
human rights duties. One should mention three examples of this trend towards
the “subsidiarization” of subsidiarity, all three being ironically explicitly grounded
in subsidiarity: first of all, the increasing proceduralization and hence abstraction
of the ECtHR’s review160; secondly, its future preventive control once Protocol 16
ECHR enters into force and the advisory opinion procedure applies to the States
Parties that have ratified it161; and, finally, the development of remedial control by
the ECtHR as in the prescription of individual measures. These developments are
worrying, first of all, because the so-called primarity of human rights duties, and
the primary responsibility of domestic authorities, exist independently from the
principle of subsidiarity: they amount to the latter’s background and not to one of
its implications. Secondly, human rights subsidiarity pertains to the ex post review
of human rights implementation, and not to the ex ante specification of human
rights duties by an international human rights body or court.
Another related cause of concern is that many authors, disappointed by the
complexity of human rights subsidiarity, have turned to alternative principles. The
157 See also Føllesdal, “Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation.”
158 For a complete argument, see Samantha Besson, “L’e´volution du controˆle europe´en: une sub-
sidiarite´ toujours plus subsidiaire,” in L’avenir de la Cour europe´enne des droits de l’homme (Paris:
Pe´done, forthcoming 2016).
159 See e.g., “ECtHR Background paper, Subsidiarity: ATwo-Sided Coin?” and the focus of the 2015
ECtHR Seminar where half of the discussions pertained to the responsibilities of States Parties. See
also Tulkens, “Conclusions ge´ne´rales.”
160 See also Dubout, “La proce´duralisation des droits.”
161 See e.g., Gerards, “Advisory Opinions, Preliminary Rulings and the New Protocol 16 to the
European Convention on Human Rights.”
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risk is that they are thereby re-inventing the wheel of subsidiarity albeit under
another name. One may mention, for instance, the fast developing references to
“embeddedness,”162 “partnership”163 or “judicial dialogue”164 in ECHR scholar-
ship. While it is correct to say that judicial dialogue between domestic courts and
the ECtHR has contributed to the quality of the Court’s human rights reasoning,
that dialogue should take place in the context of an individual application pend-
ing before the ECtHR and not early on before the domestic court has even had a
chance to decide and hence to give reasons. Judicial dialogue promotes human
rights subsidiarity, but should not be invoked to dispense with it altogether, pre-
empt the reason-giving of domestic judges and replace it by that of the ECtHR
itself.
V. Conclusions
This article aimed at understanding what is subsidiary about human rights. It
started from the practice of human rights subsidiarity and identified three types of
subsidiarity (procedural, substantive and remedial) therein. It then proceeded with
a comparative-normative discussion of the different dimensions of subsidiarity
encountered in the human rights context and, on that basis, proposed a differ-
entiated interpretation of human rights subsidiarity.
The main thrust of the argument has been that the concept of subsidiarity is
at play in international human rights law with its two-step functioning and
two-parties structure, but that it is very different from the other conceptions of
subsidiarity we know of. In a nutshell, the main specificities of human rights
subsidiarity that have been established are the following.
First of all, its context is not that of a polity or autonomous legal order, but the
political or judicial review of domestic human rights implementation by an inter-
national body or court. Second, its subjects are domestic authorities (including
judicial ones), on the one hand, and international human rights bodies or courts,
on the other, and neither States or infra-national and international political
entities, nor individuals or groups of individuals. Third, its object is an interna-
tional judicial or institutional monitoring or reviewing competence, on the one
hand, and a domestic positive duty to respect and protect human rights that
includes a duty to acquire a judicial competence of decision and review, on the
other, and not either competences or duties to review alone. Fourth, its function is
sequencing the complementary exercise of review (procedural subsidiarity) or its
intensity (substantive subsidiarity) between domestic authorities and international
human rights bodies or courts, and not allocating competing competences, or the
exercise thereof, to either one or the other of the subjects of subsidiarity. In short,
human rights subsidiarity amounts to the complementarity of review powers and
162 See e.g., Helfer, “Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights.”
163 See e.g., Gerards, “The European Court of Human Rights and National Courts.”
164 See e.g., Dean Spielmann, “Whither Judicial Dialogue?—Sir Thomas More Lecture,” Lincoln’s
Inn, London, 12 October 2015. http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20151012_Spiel
mann_Sir_Thomas_More_Lecture.pdf.
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responsibilities, as opposed to the competition of review powers. Fifth, the justi-
fication of human rights subsidiarity is democratic (and, accordingly, epistemic in
some cases of reasonable disagreement), but not in the way subsidiarity is usually
justified in a democratic polity of polities. There is indeed only one democratic
polity at stake in human rights subsidiarity: the domestic one. Human rights
subsidiarity’s democratic justification actually goes back to equality and the egali-
tarian dimension of human rights themselves. Sixth, the test of human rights
subsidiarity is the effectiveness of the domestic protection of the international
minimal human rights standard. The test for this, in circumstances of widespread
and persistent reasonable disagreement about the effectiveness of human rights, is
the existence or absence of a democratic transnational consensus about a specific
human right and its duties. Seventh, the limits on human rights subsidiarity are
egalitarian and democratic and reflect its justification. They consist in, more
specifically, non-discrimination rights and the basic equality of every human
right-holder. Finally, the review of human rights subsidiarity has not been insti-
tutionalized yet unlike what happens in other contexts. It would be fraught with
difficulties in any case for it implies a review of a review (of a review) and, further,
one that would have to be conducted by the same international human rights
body or court.
Understanding the specificities of human rights subsidiarity is particularly im-
portant as current interpretations of human rights subsidiarity tend to make it
more and more subsidiary. Human rights subsidiarity has been made subsidiary,
first of all, in conceptual terms. This is due to common theoretical conflations
with other conceptions of subsidiarity that are remote from what justifies human
rights subsidiarity in the first place: the inherent egalitarian and hence democratic
dimension of human rights. We should be cautious, as a result, about quick
analogies with EU law or federal conceptions of subsidiarity, but also with the
Catholic social doctrine of subsidiarity. The second context of subsidiarization of
human rights subsidiarity has occurred in practice and, ironically, in the name of
subsidiarity. While it is true that the complementing of domestic authorities’
reviewing is the second prong of the (human rights) subsidiarity principle and
that it may and should take place in certain cases, international human rights
bodies and courts have been turning that complementing into the focal point of
subsidiarity. So-doing, they are paradoxically transforming subsidiarity into a tool
to pre-determine the human rights duties and responsibilities of States and are, as
a result, pre-empting its function and justification entirely.
Once the focus is back on human rights subsidiarity for what it is, progress
could be made with respect to how it is used in human rights reasoning. From a
normative perspective, tying human rights subsidiarity back to its egalitarian and
democratic justification could help specifying and justifying its tests and limita-
tions along the lines I have proposed. More practically, this could help addressing
important practical challenges international human rights law is currently facing,
and in particular in the context of the reform of the ECHR system.
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